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ABSTRACT 
In September, 1914, William F. Willoughby arrived in 
Peking to serve as legal adviser to Yuan Shih-k'ai, 
President of the Republic of China. He brought to his 
work in China extensive experience in government re-
organization. While serving as treasurer of the Council 
of Puerto Rico, a member of the Taft Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency in Government, and as assistant 
director of the Census Bureau, he had won significant 
acclaim for his efforts to introduce the techniques of 
scientific management to public administration. This 
thesis is the result of an investigation and evaluation 
of Willoughby's eighteen-month tenure as adviser. 
Like American Minister Paul Reinsch and President 
Woodrow Wilson, Willoughby believed that no progress 
toward true republican government could be made in China 
without the existence of a stable government. Conse-
quently, he proposed significant changes in China's 
taxation and civil service systems and urged Yuan Shih-
k 'ai to establish close political and financial ties 
with the United States. The existence of a strong 
government and close ties with the United States not only 
enhanced the prospects for eventual republican government 
but allowed China to become a "fair field" for American 
economic, political, and social influence. 
A study of Willoughby's memoranda and correspondence 
thus reveals that he was typical of the progressives who 
wished to influence China's development and that his 
proposals for reform were entirely consistent with the 
Open Door policy. Had Yuan Shih-k'ai sincerely desired 
the establishment of republican government, Willoughby's 
plans might have influenced China's development. Instead, 
Yuan attempted to restore imperial rule in China. More-
over, Willoughby's proposals were inconsistent with 
China's ancient Confucian scholar tradition and required 
wholesale adoption of western values. In short, Willoughby 
had little direct influence on either American Far Eastern 
policy or on China's development. His failure to export 
progressive reforms to China reminds us that America's 
ability to determine the development of other nations is 
limited and that a nation's political institutions must 
reflect its own history and culture. 
v 
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY 
A PROGRESSIVE IN CHINA, 1914-1916 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
entrepreneurs, educators, diplomats, missionaries, engi-
neers, and social workers travelled to China to exploit 
new markets and to "awake the sleeping Chinese" to western 
social, political, and economic ideas. Although it may 
appear at first glance that the interests of these 
travellers conflicted, such was not the case, for they all 
espoused mutually interdependent goals. The social or 
political reformers who wished to develop a modern republic 
in China knew that political and social progress depended 
upon the development of an economy which could provide a 
decent standard of living for China's people. The entre-
preneurs who promoted economic development needed a stable 
government with a modern administrative system to protect 
their financial interests. Both the entrepreneurs and the 
reformers found friends among the diplomats, for a stable 
government was sorely needed in China to maintain the 
policy of the Open Door. 
Arnone the Americans who travelled to China to promote 
her social, economic, and political progress was William 
Franklin Willoughby, deputy legal adviser to the President 
of the Republic of China, Yuan Shih-k'ai. Prior to his 
appointment as legal adviser, Willoughby had served as a 
2 
3 
member of the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency 
in Government, treasurer and then secretary of the Council 
of Puerto Rico, and assistant director of the Census 
Bureau. He had won considerable acclaim for his efforts 
to secure labor reform and introduce the techniques of 
scientific management to public administration. 
His work in Peking from 1914 to 1916 provides a 
striking example of the convergence of the goals of the 
entrepreneur, the reformer, and the diplomat. Because he 
admired the political systems of Great Britain and the 
United States, he wanted very much to have China adopt a 
western model for her political development. He strongly 
believed that close diplomatic relations with the United 
States and successful American investments in China could 
encourage her development along western lines. In 
diplomacy, reform, and investment, Willoughby saw the tools 
to build a stable China, a country capable of resisting 
Japanese military and commercial encroachments while 
maintaining an open door to influence from the United 
States. 
The William F. Willoughby Papers in the Earl Gregg 
Swem Library of the College of William and Mary contain 
significant information about Willoughby's service as 
deputy legal adviser, including letters to his twin brother 
Westel and fifteen memoranda submitted to Yuan Shih-k'ai. 
These sources indicate that Willoughby was in many respects 
typical of the progressives who saw China as a new western 
•• , __ t""'J z l 
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frontier to which Americans could export political, social, 
and economic ideas and institutions. 
Willoughby was, however, only one of several advisers 
to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, and Yuan's motives in seeking 
foreign advice were questionable. To evaluate Willoughby's 
term as an adviser, one must ask what he knew of China's 
political traditions, what effect his progressive orien-
tation had upon his advice, and whether his advice was 
realistic and valuable to the Chinese. In short, this 
thesis should measure the impact of Willoughby's advice 
upon China's development. 
The relationship between Willoughby and the United 
States' policy towards China also merits investigation. 
The sources studied during preparation of this thesis 
suggest that Willoughby was not in any formal sense an 
agent of the United States' government. Nevertheless, 
Willoughby maintained close but informal contact with the 
American diplomatic community in Peking, and his advice to 
Yuan Shih-k'ai on both foreign and domestic matters was 
certainly consistent with State Department objectives. 
Therefore, an analysis of Willoughby's career as an adviser 
not only should include an evaluation of his impact on 
China but should determine if his position had any substan-
tive impact on American policy towards China and the Far 
East. 
CHAPTER I 
THE AMERICAN FRONTIER MOVES WEST 
At the time of Willoughby's appointment as legal 
adviser, China had long been beset by domestic rebellion 
and foreign exploitation. During the nineteenth century, 
poor imperial leadership and revolts like the great Taiping 
Rebellion of 1850-1864 had gravely weakened the authority 
of China's Manchu dynasty. By mid-century, Great Britain, 
France, and other western nations had used their superior 
military power to force China's acceptance of a series of 
commercial treaties. These "unequal treaties" had two 
unfortunate effects, from a Chinese point of view. First, 
the commercial and legal privileges granted to westerners 
undermined China's sovereignty and threatened China with 
eventual dismemberment by the western powers. Second, 
the influx of western culture that accompanied trade 
intensified China's domestic turmoil and directly challenged 
the superiority of her political and social institutions. 1 
Worried by the continued assaults upon China's 
sovereignty and traditional values, many Chinese called 
for modernization and reform to meet the challenge posed 
by the West. Leaders such as Li Hung-chang, governor of 
1
John King Fairbank, The United States and China 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 147. 
5 
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Kiangsu Province, urged China to resist further encroach-
ments through "self-strengthening," an application of 
western technology to armaments, communications, and 
industry. The self-strengthening movement continued for 
thirty years, but China's attempts at modernization proved 
ineffective against nations which were anxious to expand 
their influence in Asia. In 1895 a modern, westernized 
Japan inflicted a humiliating defeat upon China and gained 
control of Korea. Japan's victory thoroughly discredited 
China's self-strengthening and opened her to new foreign 
demands for lucrative commercial concessions. The debacle 
of 1895 and the ensuing scramble for China's trade, rail-
roads, and mineral resources caused her intellectuals to 
demand more substantive reform. 2 
The reform proposals of one intellectual, K'ang Yu-wei, 
won the attention of the Emperor Kuang-hsu. In the summer 
of 1898, the emperor--under K'ang's tutelage--issued nearly 
fifty decrees to reform China's administrative system. The 
reforms were short-lived. In September, the conservatives 
rallied around the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi, overthrew the 
emperor, and reestablished a reactionary regime. 3 Convinced 
that the Manchu court would not support progressive reform, 
many Chinese intellectuals embraced revolution as the means 
2
Ibid., pp. 176-177, 179. 
3
Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), p. 54. 
7 
to rid China of a bankrupt monarchy and save her from dis-
memberment. 4 
The crisis in China coincided with crisis in the 
United States. The depression of 1892, the closing of the 
frontier in 1890, and the rapid industrialization of 
preceding decades convinced many Americans that the nation 
faced "market stagnation." Men of such diverse background 
as entrepreneur F. L. Stetson, populist Jerry Simpson, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and author Brooks Adams argued 
that America needed an overseas market to absorb its 
surplus manufactures. Without that market, the United 
States' economy would collapse, and the ensuing economic 
dislocations would destroy American democratic institutions. 5 
The Americans who believed that expansion would 
preserve democracy and prosperity frequently envisioned 
China as a promising market for surplus American goods. 
Senator William Frye of Maine expressed this sentiment 
when he asserted: "We must have the market [China] or we 
shall have revolution. 116 The New York State Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and 
the American Development Company also wanted immediate 
4
rmmanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 539. 
5
william A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
(New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1962), p. 24. 
6
rbid., pp. 25-27. 
access to the Chinn market as "the solution to the closed 
frontier and industrial glut at home." 7 The return of 
prosperity as the decade closed did not dim the vision of 
China as a consumer of American goods. Although China 
absorbed only three percent of all United States exports 
in the 1890's, the American Asiatic Association continued 
to promote the China market well into the twentieth 
century, long after Frye's specter of revolution faded. 8 
Commercial interests were not alone in their desire 
to carry the flag to China. Missionaries asked President 
8 
William McKinley for protection and support for their 
public schools. 9 Robert LaFollette and Theodore Roosevelt 
believed that expansion would advance the cause of 
civilization by carrying Anglo-Saxon ideas to the world. 10 
Others, including Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, argued 
that an expansionist foreign policy strengthened naval 
power and promoted national prestige. Still other Americans 
believed that the nation had a unique mission to spread 
the ideals of representative government throughout the 
7Thomas McCormick, China Market: America's Quest for 
Informal Empire (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 53. 
See also Jerry Israel, Progressives and the Open Door 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), pp. 13-
15. 
8Paul Varg, "The Myth of the China Market, 1890-1914," 
American Historical Review, 73 (Feb., 1968), 742-743. 
9
warren Cohen, America's Response to China (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 54. 
10w·11· i iams, Tragedy, p. 57. 
9 
11 
world. To extend United States influence abroad, 
Americans generally turned to commercial investments. As 
historian David Healy noted, these non-economic reasons 
for expansion fit into an "economic matrix," for the 
expansionists tended to "equate national worth and vitality 
with economic 12 success. 11 
Once Americans recognized China as a potential area 
for expansion, they began to worry that foreign powers 
would dismember the hapless nation before the United States 
ld t th k t •t• b . 13 cou en er e mar et on a compe 1 ive as1s. Moreover, 
both the United States and Great Britain saw in the 
scramble for concessions that was occurring a real threat 
to the balance of power in Asia. Recognizing that the 
United States did not have the military strength to impose 
its own order on the Far East, Secretary of State John 
Hay and former Assistant Secretary W. W. Rockhill, with 
British help, circulated the first Open Door note on 
14 September 6, 1899. Many Americans were convinced that 
the guarantee of a "fair field" in China would enable the 
United States to dominate the China market, and with 
11 
Israel, Progressives, p. 12. 
12D . d L 1 u . . . ( d. av1 ilea y, n1ted States Expans1on1sm Ma ison: 
Un i v e r s i t y o f W i s c on s i n P r e s s , 19 'I 0 ) , p . 1 '1'7 . 
13
rbid.' p. 165. 
14w·11· i iams, 
pp. 134-137. 
Tragedy, p. 43; McCormick, China Market, 
domination would come political stability and economic 
15 development. 
Political stability and economic development, how-
ever, did not come quickly to China. Although Americans 
who wished to "awaken" the "sleeping Chinese" to western 
values were discouraged by the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, 
they were encouraged by the Manchu dynasty's promises of 
reform. In the wake of the rebellion, the court ordered 
10 
a reorganization of China's administrative and educational 
systems and proposed a nine-year plan for implementation 
of a constitutional monarchy. In actuality, however, the 
decade of reorganization and reform did not significantly 
alter the authoritarian character of the Manchu government, 
and revolutionaries doubted the sincerity of the court's 
reform plans. They continued to agitate for the termi-
nation of Manchu rule and the establishment of a western 
16 
system of government. 
In 1911, when the Manchu dynasty attempted to use the 
fledgling national railroads as security for a loan, 
revolt broke out in the province of Szechwan and rapidly 
Ch . 17 spread across ina. In a desperate attempt to win 
15
rsrael, Progressives, p. lJ; Cohen, America's 
Response, p. 43. 
16Ch' en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 96. 
17 Ibid., pp. 108-109. 
11 
popular support and suppress the rebellion, the Manchus 
hastily established a constitutional monarchy. On 
November 1, the court appointed Yuan Shih-k'ai, a suc-
f 1 d 1 1 . 18 cess u governor an popu ar genera , as premier. 
The man to whom the Manchus offered the premiership 
was one who easily recognized opportunity for personal 
advancement. A career military officer, Yuan Shih-k'ai 
had won considerable acclaim for his success in re-
organizjng China's army after its humiliation in the Sino-
19 Japanese War. During the "Hundred Days" reforms, it 
was he who informed the Empress Dowager of the reformers' 
plans to rid the dynasty of her conservative influence. 
This act of loyalty solidified the Empress's confidence 
20 in Yuan, and he advanced rapidly under her patronage. 
As provincial governor of Shantung in 1900, he shrewdly 
recognized the Boxers' weakness and kept his province 
21 
under control even as Peking exploded. As a result of 
his caution, he won praise from western powers as a 
capable leader. A year later, as viceroy of Chihli, Yuan 
developed a close personal following among the officers 
and men of the Peiyang Army and consolidated a power base 
18 Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 559. 
19
ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 52. 
20
rbid., p. 62. 
21
rbid., pp. 70-71. 
------=--'-~--""'"'"-------------------· 
12 
among leaders in North China. 22 
Yuan's position was secure only as long as the Empress 
Dowager lived. When she died in 1908, Yuan's enemies at 
court schemed to remove him. Using the pretext of a foot 
injury, Yuan left Peking in 1909 and did not participate 
either in the last years of Manchu rule or in revolutionary 
t . . t 23 ac ivi y. Despite his enemies' scheming, he continued 
to exert influence over the northern army, which caused 
both the regent and the revolutionaries to bid for his 
support in 1911. By December of that year, Yuan entered 
peace negotiations with the revolutionaries who, by this 
time, had established a provisional government in Nanking 
under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. The revolutionaries 
offered Yuan the presidency of the Chinese Republic, an 
invitation which caused Yuan to abandon the monarchy. 
With his defection, the Manchus had little choice but to 
. t 24 abdica e. 
Although the revolutionaries elected Yuan to the 
presidency in February, 1912, many of them regarded him 
with well-placed suspicion. Before he agreed to step down 
as president, Sun Yat-sen sought pledges of Yuan's support 
22
Ibid., p. 73. 
23
1i Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840-
1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), p. 229. 
24
Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 562. 
lJ 
for constitutional government and his willingness to locate 
the capital at Nanking. Ominously, Yuan did not accept 
Nanking as the capital of the new republic. A well-timed 
nrmy "revolt" gave him a pretext for establishing the 
capital within his own power base, Peking, and at the 
same time provided him with an opportunity to secure his 
. t. 25 own posi ion. 
Yuan further consolidated his power within the new 
government by appointing military governors in the provinces 
26 
and loyal supporters to important cabinet posts. The 
Kuomintang, however, continued to dominate the National 
Assembly. To weaken the party's power, Yuan began in 1913 
27 to replace Kuomingtang generals with his own men. When 
dissident army members staged a second revolution in 
July, 1913, Yuan had little difficulty destroying the 
opposition. His triumph over the revolutionaries rein-
28 forced his position as an unchallenged ruler. 
The Kuomintang members of the National Assembly did 
not acquiesce in Yuan's accrual of power quietly. When 
Yuan tried to strengthen his position still further by 
negotiating a loan with a consortium of American, Japanese, 
25Ch' en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 134. 
26
rbid., pp. 140-144; Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 564. 
27Ch' en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 14J. 
28
rbid., pp. 167-169. 
14 
and European bankers, the Kuomintang refused to ratify 
the agreement. Yuan retaliated by ordering, or at least 
acquiescing in, the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen, a 
Kuomintang leader. He also enlisted the help of his 
military governors to secure the passage of a new 
29 
constitution which greatly increased the president's power. 
The Assembly attempted to check Yuan's growing power by 
drafting yet another constitution which would establish a 
cabinet system of government. 30 
Faced with such opposition, Yuan accused the 358 
Kuomintang assemblymen of complicity in the summer's 
revolution and revoked their credentials as members of the 
National Assembly. Without the Kuomintang members, the 
Assembly had no quorum and thus could not conduct business. 
Yuan then dissolved the Assembly. This action, however, 
did not result in the demise of the Kuomintang. Outlawed, 
the party continued to carry on underground activities 
within China and from foreign countries. 31 
Those Americans who had praised the 1911 Revolution 
29 Ibid., pp. 158-163, 177. The consortium to which 
Yuan turned for a loan was called the Six-Power Consortium. 
It included banking interests from Great Britain, France, 
Germany, the United States, Russia, and Japan. 
30ttsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 568. 
31
rbid. See also Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far 
EasternPOTicy, 1913-1921 (New York: Bookman Associates, 
1957), p. 102. 
15 
and welcomed republicanism to China did not foresee Yuan 
Shih-k'ai's swing towards absolutism. In 1912, the Outlook 
reported that American reforrners--the supporters of 
Progressivisrn--hoped that the new republic would implement 
progressive reforms. Lillian Wald, Horace Allen, and 
E. A. Ross identified the 1911 Revolution with modernization, 
democracy, reform, 32 efficiency, and progress. Edward 
Hurne, the founder of the Yale-in-China medical school 
program, claimed that the revolt "[threw] open wide the 
doors of reform and progress in China." Hurne wanted the 
West to "give unselfishly . 
in any direction."33 
. in constructive assistance 
The elevation of Yuan Shih-k'ai to the presidency 
had also met with enthusiastic responses. William Jennings 
Bryan shipped an encyclopedia of Thomas Jefferson's ideas 
to Yuan and called him "the leader of the United States of 
Ch . ,,34 ina. In 1915, William Francis Mannix, fresh from an 
interview with Yuan Shih-k'ai, reported in the Independent 
that Yuan's appearance and manner reminded him of Theodore 
Roosevelt. Enthusiastically he passed along Yuan's 
assessment of China's progress: "It may be said to our 
American friends that the new Republic of China is now 
32
rsrael, Progressives, pp. 100-102. 
33 Quoted in Jonathan Spence, To Change China (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1969), p. 164. 
34 Israel, Progressives, p. 101. 
16 
35 fairly started on the right road. 11 Another American, 
Sherwood Eddy, writing for World's Work, besides noticing 
the resemblance to Roosevelt, found parallels between Yuan's 
career and that of George Washington. 36 In the eyes of 
both Mannix and Eddy, China was clearly making progress 
towards democracy and efficiency. 
The Taft administration did not completely share the 
enthusiasm of the journalists and reformers. Since the 
circulation of the Open Door notes, the United States had 
desired the establishment of an effective Chinese govern-
ment, both to provide stability in Asia's balance of power 
and to allow United States' trade and investment in China. 37 
Taft wanted to promote the United States' influence there, 
but he tried to maintain the Open Door through partici-
pation in the Four-Power, and later the Six-Power, con-
sortium. Therefore, when the Chinese established a 
republic, Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox 
hesitated to extend recognition. They feared that the 
Republic might fail to survive and that its collapse would 
touch off greater instability. Turmoil in China would 
then encourage further encroachment upon her sovereignty. 
35
William Francis Mannix, "The Chinese Republic 
Reports Progress, 11 Independent, 8J (July 25, 1915 ), 114. 
36
sherwood Eddy, "An Interview with Yuan Shih-k 'ai," 
W or 1 d ' s Work, 2 9 ( Mar . , 1915 ) , 5 3 5 . 
37
Cohen, America's Response, p. 74. 
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Moreover, Taft--ever the legalist--was reluctant to extend 
recognition while other consortium members waited for 
proof that the Republic could effectively govern China. 38 
The issue still hung fire when Taft left office in 1913. 
When Woodrow Wilson entered the White House, he 
altered American strategy. Like Taft, he believed that 
American culture and institutions could be promoted with 
trade, but the consortium smacked too much of the "money 
trust." Moreover, Wilson disliked American participation 
in a consortium whose members had designs on China's 
integrity. 39 Consequently, he rejected the cooperative 
approach und embarked on a unilateral effort to maintain 
the Open Door. The United States recognized the Republic 
of China on May 2, 1913, and later withdrew from the Six-
Power consortium. 
Wilson was willing to assist China morally and 
financially, but he would not provide any assistance to 
American entrepreneurs which would threaten China's 
sovereignty. Indeed, as historian Tien-yi Li pointed out, 
Wilson believed that the United States had a Christian 
mission in the Far East: "the principlesof order, justice, 
character, liberty, and good government should be taught 
to politically undisciplined peoples in that region." He 
38
charles Vevier, The United States and China, 1906-
1913 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 205-207. 
39
rbid., pp. 207-210 . 
18 
also believed that China should adopt American political 
forms. But first, China had to develop a strong central 
government to control internal disorder. In time, as 
American influence and commerce helped to stabilize China 
internally, Wilson believed that democracy would take 
40 
root. 
The president's belief that democracy, progress, and 
reform would come to China in the twentieth century was 
shared by many Americans. Indeed, American-sponsored 
reform efforts in China predated the establishment of the 
Republic. President Theodore Roosevelt had dispatched 
educator Charles Conant, political scientist Jeremiah W. 
Jenks, and labor expert Hugh Hanna to China to devise a 
41 plan for monetary reform. The 1911 Revolution sparked 
renewed efforts to brine modern, western ideas to "John 
Chinaman." D. Willard Lyon and the YMCA pushed for improve-
ment of sanitation, prison reform, and the creation of 
parks.
42 
The American journalist and evangelist Sherwood 
Eddy pointed to the Chinese government's war on opium as 
evidence of "moral reform." For Eddy and the other 
Americans, the "yellow peril" had become "the golden 
40
Tien-yi Li. Woodrow Wilson's China Policy: 1913-
1917 (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), pp. 163-164, 20J-205. 
41
Israel, Progressives, pp. 16-17. 
42
rbi"d., 22 23 PP· - · 
19 
opportunity of the West. 114 3 
Well before the end of the Manchu dynasty, missionaries 
and university men had already established the University 
of Nanking, Hangchow Christian College, and Yale-in-China 
to bring civilization and "a progressive, stable govern-
ment" to China. Yale's efforts were matched by Princeton-
in-China and later, by Wisconsin-in-China, which represented 
44 the Progressive view of governmental reform. Americans 
were pleased with these efforts to educate young Chinese; 
they were convinced that a western education of leaders 
was crucial to the creation of a modern China. 
Some American progressives went to China to promote 
reforms similar to those being promoted in the United 
States. Gifford Pinchot, for example, encouraged 
conservation of Chinese rivers and forests. Other 
conservation experts and engineers recommended the intro-
duction of efficient administrative techniques as a 
prerequisite for political and commercial progress. Dr. 
Paul S. Reinsch, American minister to China, and other 
experts such as Dr. Frank J. Goodnow of Columbia University, 
d t d l ·t· 1 f 1 A · l" 4 5 a voca e po i ica re orms a ong merican ines. 
Yuan Shih-k'ai was not unreceptive to offers of 
43
Eddy, "An Interview with Yuan Shih-k'ai," 536-537. 
44
rsrael, Progressives, pp. 18-19, 113. 
45
rti"d., 20 123 p. ' . 
20 
Amcrlcun cdd in r,ovcrnrnent reform, since he hoped that 
friendly relations with wester11 nations would win loans 
f o r C }1 i n a . To ea i n s u c h frn pp or t , Yuan cm p 1 o ye d a numb c r 
of forc:len advisers and mai11tained favorable connectionfJ 
with U1e Arncri can pres ~J. 46 In 1913, while vis i tine China, 
Dr. Charles VJ. Eliot, presj dent of Harvard, learned of 
Yuar1 1 s desire for an American adviser and apparently 
informed Lhc Chjnesc that the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace was willing to nominate experts for 
the pofd ti on. The nomination of Dr. Frank Goodnow, a law 
professor at Columbia, as legal adviser was accepted by 
the Republic of China. Goodnow served in China until the 
summer of 1914, when he accepted the presidency of Johns 
1- k . u . •t /t7 lop ins n1 vers1 y. At that time he returned to the 
United States but retained his title. Goodnow was·replaced 
in Peking by William Franklin Willouehby, who was officially 
designuted as deputy legal adviser to the Republic of China. 
The Americans who enthusiastically hailed the revolution 
of 1911 perhaps ren1ized that China was merely a nominal 
republic. Nevertheless, Willoughby and other American 
reformers were confident that they could affect change in 
Chi n a , he 11> he r d e v e 1 op i n to a mo de r n , r e pub 1 i can s ta t e , 
and expand United Sta tcs' influence in the Far East. But 
46Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 173. 
47 Ibid., pp. 203-204. 
traditional China had not completely disappeared in the 
turmoil of the past century, and her leaders did not 
agree on the type of government China needed. To graft 
21 
western democracy onto a tradition of authoritarian rule 
and to stabilize a country in the midst of sweeping change 
would prove exceedingly difficult, even for men of 
Willouchby's experience and ability. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EDUCATION OF A NEW CHINA HAND 
Only forty-seven years old at the time of his appoint-
ment as deputy legal adviser, William F. Willoughby was 
well-known in academic and government circles as a scholar, 
diplomat, and administrator. Like many of his contempora-
ries of the Progressive Era, Willoughby was very much aware 
of the massive social and economic dislocations that 
accompanied the emergence of an urban, industrial America. 
He, too, recognized that government had to chaq~e as the 
society and economy changed in order to cope with industri-
alization and urbanization. In the first decades of the 
twentieth century, Willoughby's reform activities, 
especially the introduction of scientific management 
techniques to government, won him substantial recognition. 
An acknowledged expert in the field of public administration, 
Willoughby was very much a logical choice to fill the 
advisory post left vacant by Goodnow's departure from 
China. 
The son of a Washington, D. C. judge, Willoughby was 
graduated from Johns Hopkins University in 1888. Newspaper 
clippings and personal records revealed a young man 
remarkably similar to Frank Merriwell stereotype--both 
he and his twin brother Westel were serious students and 
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talented athletes. While still an undergraduate concen-
trating in political science, he and his brother co-
authored a government textbook for the Washington, D.C., 
public schools. Three years later, he undertook a study 
of the French and Prussian civil service systems for the 
United States commissioner of education. In 1894, after 
completing his post-graduate studies at Johns Hopkins, 
Willoughby was appointed a statistical expert to the 
Department of Labor. 1 
The year in which Willoughby entered the department 
was marked by labor turmoil. Only months before his 
23 
appointment, Coxey's Army of unemployed had marched on the 
nation's capital, and the Pullman strike shook the nation. 
As an employee of the Department of Labor, Willoughby 
encountered first-hand the massive social and economic 
dislocations that accompanied the industrial depression of 
1893-98. But like many Americans, he welcomed the new 
industrial age. He did not regard the formation of giant 
industrial combinations as either inherently evil or un-
natural. In an 1898 article for the Yale Review, Willoughby 
argued that the formation of trusts was a natural result, 
a "normal evolution of industry. 112 Combinations could 
1 For clippings relating to William F. Willoughby's 
Johns Hopkins years, see the Willoughby Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 1, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and 
Mary. 
2William F. Willoughby, "Concentration of Industry in 
the United States," Yale Review, 7 (May, 1898), 82, 
Willoughby Papers, B'()'j(?. 
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provide positive benefits: the trusts often encouraged 
innovative and efficient use of resources, and they brought 
stability and predictability to the marketplace. Nor did 
combinations inevitably pose a threat to the worker, 
since large firms miEht be more capable of providing 
benefits to workers than small firms. Attempts to halt 
the natural process of concentration, he believed, were 
"doomed to failure" and were "thoroughly retrogressive. 113 
Willoughby's identification of concentrated economic 
power with progress was not altogether unqualified. In 
language which foreshadowed the "New Nationalism" of 
Theodore Roosevelt, he noted that only "normal" concentra-
tions could honestly be praised, but "forced concentration" 
to achieve higher prices led to abuse. Indeed, Willoughby 
argued that "the public should not be left at the mercy 
of a few men." To prevent abuse, he proposed two counter-
weights to the power of corporations: a conservative 
trade union movement and a degree of government regulation. 4 
Although Willoughby did not propose specific regulatory 
measures, he did argue, as did others in the Progressive 
Era, that the application of proper management and 
administrative techniques could control the chaos and abuse 
that accompanied rapid industrialization. 
3
rbid.' 92-93. 
4
rbid., 93-94. 
Proper 
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administration was more than a means to an end; to 
Willoughby, it became an end in itself. Good government 
rested upon sound and efficient administration. 
The article for the Yale Review not only expressed 
Willoughby's opinion concerning the desirability of 
concentration but also revealed his long-standing concern 
for improved working conditions in the nation's industries. 
During his post-graduate studies, Willoughby had received 
two prizes from the American Economic Association for his 
essays, "Housing for the Poor in Cities" and "Child 
5 
Labor." While a statistical expert for the Department of 
Labor, he served as a representative of the United States 
to international conferences on labor accidents, workmen's 
compensation laws, and housing. 6 Willoughby's interest in 
labor problems continued long after he left the department. 
Some time after 1900, he served as president of the 
American Association for Labor Legislation, identified by 
historian Arthur Link as one of the "more radical" Pro-
gressive groups "dedicated to the cause of social justice. 117 
5
see Chicago Tribune, January 24, 1891, and an un-
identified newspaper clipping, Willoughby Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 1. 
6
carroll D. Wright to Willoughby, February 20, 1900, 
and W. Q. Graham to all diplomatic and consular officers, 
August, 1894, ibid., Box 1, Folder 2. 
7
Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 
(New York: Harper and Row, Torchbooks, 1954), p. 54. 
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The word radical, of course, has different shades of 
meaning. But to Willoughby, the solution to labor problems 
lay in the promotion of trade unionism, mediation, and 
appropriate labor legislation. He revealed his essentially 
moderate approach in a 1901 article for Current Encyclo-
pedia, in which he praised the efforts of the National 
Civil Federation to promote arbitration of major labor 
disputes. 8 The Federation, according to historian James 
Weinstein, hardly advocated the destruction of corporate 
capitalism; rather, its objective was to "stabilize the 
relationship between the work force and the corporate 
enterprise. 119 
The American Association for Labor Legislation was no 
hotbed of radicalism either. Founded by middle class 
reformers and financed by John D. Rockefeller and Elbert 
Gary, the Association worked to win acceptance of labor 
reforms and did achieve some 10 successes. In 1916, 
Congress passed the Kern-McGillicudy Act to provide work-
man's compensation for federal employees. As president 
of the AALL, Willoughby had actively participated in the 
Association's efforts to secure such legislation. Upon 
8
william F. Willoughby, "Conciliation and Arbitration " 
' Current Encyclopedia, August 1901, Willoughby Papers, Box 7. 
9 James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal 
State, 1900-1908 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. J7-39. 
lOibid., p. 48. 
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hi~] departure from China, the ~York Times noted that 
Willoughby had ''insistently demanded laws requiring better 
hours und working conditions for women and children." 11 
llis participation in labor reform in the years prior to 
1916 clearly identified Willoughby with those Progressives 
12 
actively engaged in social and economic reform. 
In September, 1900, Willoughby accepted an instructor-
ship in economics at Harvard University. He did not remain 
long in Cambridge, however, for in 1901, President Theodore 
Roosevelt appointed him treasurer of Puerto Rico.
1 3 
Willoughby remained on the island until 1909, serving as 
treasurer, secretary, and then acting governor. During 
these eight years, Willoughby overhauled the island's 
financial and administrative systems and reorganized 
14 
municipal governments. 
At the core of Willoughby's work in Puerto Rico was a 
philosophy of government which not only placed him squarely 
in the mainstream of Progressive thought, but also strongly 
influenced his later recommendations to China. Central to 
111. k in ' Woodrow Wilson, p. 226; New York Times, July 
lJ, 1914. 
121. k in ' Woodrow Wilson, p. 54. 
lJJ. H. Gore to William F. Willoughby, March Jl, 1900; 
Allen Danforth to Willoughby, September 27, 1900; and 
Treasury Department to Willoughby, November 7, 1901, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. 
l4Clipping from the Daily Princetonian, February 26, 
1910, ~., Box 1, Folder 
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Willoughby's reorganization of the island's government was 
Lhe creation of a competent, well-trained, and impartial 
civil r;ervice. A professional civil service had long 
been regarded as a means of curbing "bossism" and cor-
ruption within the American political system, and 
Willoughby's creation of a civil service for Puerto Rico 
was intended to serve much the same purpose. But to 
reformers such as Willoughby, E. L. Godkin, and Frank J. 
Goodnow, the divorce of politics from the administration 
of government was more than an insurance policy against 
corruption; it became a means of establishing a "more 
scientific," "more efficient" government. The use of 
"experts" resulted not only in good government at the 
lowest possible cost but also in a government capable of 
resolving the complex social and economic problems of an 
urban, industrial society. 15 
According to historian Samuel Haber, it was Frank 
Goodnow who most effectively articulated the need to sepa-
rate government administration from politics. Willoughby 
supported wholeheartedly Goodnow's belief that professional 
administration would provide better government. "The 
16 government best administered is best," he wrote. He 
15 Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 101-103, 107. 
16
rbid., pp. 105-106. 
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considered himself an expert, a specialist who could use 
his knowledge and scientific methods to work for the good 
of the nation. So convinced was he of the dangers of 
mixing politics with administration that there is no 
record of his ever having cast a ballot in a presidential 
1 . 17 e ection. 
Willoughby's eight years in Puerto Rico gave him a 
remarkable opportunity to turn ideas into substance. He 
not only established a civil service for the island but 
reorganized its taxation and accounting systems. He 
regarded his effort to transplant progressive ideas to 
Puerto Rico as successful, for he wrote: 
. there was secured a service of 
greater efficiency than many believed 
possible to secure from one manned 
exclusively by native inhabitants of 
the Island.18 
Through his brother Westel, Willoughby received word 
of Goodnow's interest in the reorganization of Puerto 
Rico's government. In a letter to Goodnow at the close of 
his term, Willoughby remarked that the American initiation 
17This information is not easily confirmed, and 
Willoughby's failure to vote might have been due to the 
fact that he was a resident of Washington, D. C., for most 
of his life. From an interview with William Westel 
Willoughby, Bohun Farm, Mathews, Virginia, July 31, 1974. 
18
w·11· · l iam F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Some Factors 
Involved in Securing Efficiency in the Organization of the 
Personnel in Government Service," p. 10,.Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 42. 
of the civil service system had rescued sixty-six cities 
from bankruptcy and provided Puerto Rican citizens with 
"works of permanent public utility. 1119 As a member of 
the Council of Puerto Rico, Willoughby's progressive 
ideas merged nicely with American imperialism. He had 
worked diligently to bring civilization, justice, and 
efficiency to backward peoples. 
30 
Although Willoughby regarded his work in Puerto Rico 
as challenging, he left the island at the end of his 
second term to accept an appointment as assistant director 
20 
of the Census Bureau. His appointment and that of the 
director, E. Dana Durand, were hailed as major steps towards 
securing scientific management and efficiency in govern-
ment, because the appointments in the past had been part 
of the patronage system. Review of Reviews praised both 
Willoughby and Durand as "university-trained specialists," 
and Willoughby was singled out specifically as a "university 
21 
type." The creation of a permanent Census Bureau seemed 
a successful implementation of the Progressives' "Wisconsin 
Id 1122 ea. 
19William F. Willoughby to Frank J. Goodnow, Jan. 9, 
1909, Frank J. Goodnow Papers, Manuscript Collection, Johns 
Hopkins University Library. 
20
rnterview with William W. Willoughby, Bahun Farm, 
Mathews, Virginia, July Jl, 1974. 
21
c1. . f R . f . S 1909 ipping ram eview o Reviews, ept. , 
Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 1. 
22 Haber, Efficiency, p. 106. 
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Two years later, Willoughby returned to the problem 
of government reorganization when he joined the Taft 
Commission on Economy and Efficiency in Government. As a 
member of the Commission, Willoughby came into close 
contact with other government administrators and experts 
on administration and finance. The Commission's chairman, 
Frederick Cleveland, had long been associated with New 
York's Bureau of Municipal Research, an organization which 
promoted the application of th? techniques of scientific 
management to city and state problems. Frank Goodnow, 
Lhen a professor of law at Columbia University, also was 
a member of the six-member • • 2 3 commission. 
The reforms recommended by Willoughby and the other 
members were essentially administrative, in keeping with 
the philosophy that efficient government could best be 
achieved through personnel and procedural alterations. 
Specifically, the Commission pressed for the adoption of 
proper budget procedures as a method of setting government 
priorities. The Commission also recommended the creation 
of a central administrative agency, very much like the 
present Office of Management and the Budget, to control 
both the personnel and the operation of government 
departments. 24 
The commission's recommendations fell upon deaf ears. 
2 3Ibid., pp. 110-112. 
24 Ibid., pp. 113-114. 
Congress did nothing to act upon them during Taft's 
administration, and when Wilson entered office, the 
recommendations were laid aside. The commission's work 
was not totally wasted, however, for some of the reforms 
were actually initiated at the municipal level. 25 More-
over, Willoughby received considerable attention in the 
press for his work, and in 1920 he mounted a successful 
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campaign for the institution of a national budget system. 
His experience on the Taft Commission also influenced 
his work in China. Throughout his term, he urged the 
Chinese to draw up budgets for the operation of every 
level of government. 
At the conclusion of the commission's work, Goodnow 
had returned to Columbia, departing for China in the fall 
of 191J. Willoughby had left Washington for Princeton 
University, where he became McCormick Professor of Juris-
prudence. In 1914, he received his appointment as deputy 
legal adviser to President Yuan Shih-k'ai. 26 
Although the specific circumstances surrounding 
Willoughby's appointment are not known, one may reasonably 
surmise that his reputation as an administrator and his 
association with Goodnow over the years influenced his 
nomination for the post. State Department dispatches only 
25 Ibid., p. 116. 
26 Secretary of Princeton University to William F. 
Willoughby, June 10, 1912, Willoughby Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 1. See also newspaper clippings, Box 1, Folder 2. 
indicate that the nomination of Goodnow's successor was 
handled by the Carnegie Endowment in the same manner as 
Goodnow's original appointment. 27 
33 
The response of Willoughby's Princeton colleagues to 
his appointment was enthusiastic, and it revealed some-
thing of the prevailing American attitudes toward China. 
Fascinated by the idea of advising a nation of 400 million 
citizens, Professor Robert McElroy declared that the office 
of constitutional adviser "appeals to the imagination as 
few positions can." Noting that "a giant nation" had 
turned to Willoughby for advice on the establishment of a 
representative government, McElroy compared him to an 
ambassador with "plenary powers to interpret the ideas 
of the West to the minds of the East. 1128 
The Daily Princetonian emphasized the importance of 
Willoughby's position as adviser, noting that he would 
"guide the organization of the government itself." He 
would advise the Chinese on presidential powers, the 
formation of the "central Parliament or Congress," and the 
establishment of the executive departments. "In fact," the 
newspaper concluded, "he will have the most important and 
27 J. B. Moore, Counselor, to James Brown Scott, 
Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Jan. 24, 1914, United States Department of State 
Decimal File, 893.0lA/22. 
28Robert McNutt McElroy, in an unidentified article, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 1. 
,, .... , ... ~··; .. __ _.;;."" 
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responsible part in the great work of creating a new 
29 government for one of the greatest nations in the world." 
The New York Times and the Boston Herald reminded readers 
of Willoughby's work with government reorganization and 
labor reform. 3° Clearly, the reform impulse in America 
was not confined within national borders; progressive 
reforms could be carried to China. China would benefit 
immeasurably from American willingness to help her develop 
representative government. 
The China that Willoughby and his family found upon 
their arrival on October lJ, 1914 belied the optimism of 
McElroy and the Daily Princetonian. In January, 1914, 
after he dissolved China's National Assembly, Yuan Shih-
k'ai virtually ruled alone. Only a sixty-nine member 
Political Council functioned as his adviser. 31 In order 
to maintain his legitimacy, Yuan called a National 
Conference in March, 1914 to draw up a provisional consti-
tution. The finished document, promulgated May 1, 1914, 
gave Yuan extraordinary power over appointments and 
legislation. The constitution was ostensibly drafted 
with the assistance of Frank Goodnow, who afterwards 
29D ·1 P . t . ai y rince on1an, n.d., ibid., Box 1, Folder 2. 
30 New York Times, July lJ, 1914; and Boston Herald, 
July 14, l9l4, ibid., Box 1, Folder 1. 
31 Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), p. 178. 
I 
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returned to the United States. 32 
The New York Times found the new constitution "remark-
able for the powers of administration it confers upon the 
president. 1133 An editorial in Outlook lamented the 
"reactionary" nature of the new constitution because it 
placed so much power in the president's hands. 34 Goodnow, 
however, was not disappointed with the document, at least 
publicly. Although he admitted upon his return that the 
president's powers were extensive, he also noted that the 
Chinese legislature was not too weak to check the executive. 
He reminded those who were dissatisfied with the constitution 
that it was merely a provisional document, until the 
transition to a representative form of government could be 
effected. 35 In reality, Yuan Shih-k'ai never called the 
legislature into being. The Council of State (Ts'an-cheng 
Yuan), a consultative body, acted in its place until the 
monarchial movement was well under way. Yuan's power to 
rule China was practically unchecked.3 6 
En route to China, Willoughby met many diplomats, 
businessmen, and correspondents who were familiar with 
32 New York Times, May 2, 1914. 
33 rbid. 
3411 China, 11 Outlook, 107 (July 4, 1914), 523-524. 
35 Frank J. Goodnow, in New York Times, June 22, 1914. 
36ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 179. 
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conditions there. They were, on the whole, pessimistic 
about the chances for "decent government." After extensive 
conversutions with them, Willoughby concluded that the 
cstabljshment of a "good government" in China would be 
more difficult than in either the Philippines or Puerto 
. 37 Rico. 
Upon his arrival in Peking, Willoughby discovered that 
the situation was more precarious than he imagined. The 
war had cut off China from European loans, weakening her 
financial stability; furthermore, the Japanese seizure of 
German territory in China severely strained Sino-Japanese 
l t . 38 re a ions. Nevertheless, his first audience with Yuan 
Shih-k'ai was ~uspicious. Yuan was "strong, bright, and 
eenial-looking, 11 he reported, and able to "bear his 
responsibilities without undue worry. 1139 Willoughby 
also established cordial relations with the American 
community in Peking, but he was careful to maintain a 
discreet relationship with American Minister Paul S. 
Reinsch. To his brother Westel he wrote, "My relations 
with the Legation should not be so close as to obscure 
in any way the fact that I am a Chinese and not an American 
37w. F. Willoughby to Westel Willoughby, Sept. 23, 
1914, Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
38w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 15, 1914, ibid. 
39w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 29, 1914, ibid. 
--
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official. 1140 
For nearly three weeks after his arrival, much of 
Willoughby's time was spent in formal calls in the Legation 
Quarter, sight-seeing, and conversations with diplomats 
and newsmen. His impressions of Peking were very much 
like those of any Westerner. The beauty of the Chinese 
palaces and the colorful street scenes were frequently 
mentioned in letters to his brother and sister. As he 
travelled in Peking, Willoughby found cause for optimism. 
On a drive with Reinsch, he took heart from Chinese 
playing western sports: "I believe this matter of sports 
is of far-reaching importance--it brings out the idea of 
strenuous contest without the necessity for hostile 
feeling. 1141 
Even the age-old problem of corruption did not seem 
an insurmountable barrier to progress. Willoughby noted 
with satisfaction that there was in China "a general 
desire" to "lessen this evil," and added bluntly that 
Americans could hardly criticize the Chinese for corruption 
in government. Surely, he felt, corruption could be 
controlled through "proper administrative systems for the 
collection of revenue and the auditing of expenditures."42 
4ow. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 15, 1914, ibid. 
41w. F. Willoughby to Alice, Oct. 18, 1914, ibid. 
42w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 29' 1914, ibid. 
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Unfortunately, the first memoranda which Yuan Shih-k'ai 
requested of Willoughby did not deal with administrative 
reform or constitutional revision, but with the effect 
of World War I on China. Willoughby cited racism, 
rwtionalism, and imperialism as the roots of that conflict 
but, like the Anglophile he was, he placed the blame for 
the war squarely on Germany and Austria. Predicting a 
µrotracted conflict that would greatly alter the balance 
of power in the Far East, Willoughby urged China to 
protect its territorial integrity and give no nation an 
excuse to intervene militarily in Chinese affairs. He 
also urged Yuan to begin the process of modernizing China 
even as the war continued. 4 3 
As to financial and diplomatic assistance, Willoughby 
concluded that Yuan had to look to the United States, the 
sole major power with a "keen interest and sympathy" in 
the development of a stable, representative government. 
Warning that Russia, Germany, and particularly Japan wanted 
to extend their influence and territory in China, Willoughby 
pressed Yuan to recognize that Japan might try to make 
China "more or less an autonomous dependency" while the 
European powers were at war. Consequently, China had to 
create a stable government, because Japan would use any 
evidence of internal instability as an excuse for 
43w. F. Willoughby, "The War, Its Causes, and More 
Important Consequences Likely to Result from It," Nov. 
1914, ibid., Box 5, Folder 42. 
.! 
:s 
intervention. 
inE>urr·ec tions 
She might even go so far as to stir up 
44 to provide an excuse. 
Willoughby followed up this lengthy memorandum with 
39 
another on the seizure of Kiaochow by Japan. The seizure, 
he argued, was perfectly justified as long as Japan and 
Germany were at war; but the rights associated with the 
lease did not devolve automatically to Japan upon Kiachow's 
surrender, nor did Japan have the right to permanent 
occupation of the territory.4 5 
In the laE:;t of the three memoranda on the war, Willoughby 
ar~ued that China had the right of representation at the 
peace conference since ''her territory has been made the 
theatre of military operations." This was especially 
important because the peace conference would handle the 
belligerents' claims in China. Therefore, Yuan had to 
insure that China had a voice, if not equal status with 
the belligerents at the conference. 46 
Although Willoughby was not an employee of the State 
Department, his suspicion of Japan's seizure of the German 
leaseholds in China was shared by many Americans, including 
Paul Reinsch. President Wilson and Secretary of State 
44 Ibid. 
45 w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Surrender of 
Kiaochow by Japan to China," Dec. 1914, ibid. 
46w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Representation 
of China in the Conference to Determine the Terms of Peace 
on the Conclusion of the Present War," Dec. 1914, ibid. 
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Bryan ulso feared that Japanese encroachments upon China's 
47 ~wverci gn t.Y posed a very real threat to the Open Door. 
Willoughby recognized, however, that the United States 
was preoccupied with European problems and would not risk 
wo..r to block Japan's ambitions. 47 However, by pressing 
Yuan to stabilize China internally and by promoting the 
United States as the country most likely to aid China's 
political and economic development, he was certainly 
trying to guarantee that China would remain open to 
American influence. 
The seizure of Kiaochow was very much a warning of 
future trouble. Towards the end of the year, the Japanese 
Eitrcngthened their garrisons in Manchuria and demanded that 
all Germans in China's customs service be replaced with 
49 Japanese. 
It was not until December, 1914, that Yuan Shih-k'ai 
requested the first memorandum on China's political 
problems. The request was somewhat unusual because in 
the memorandum Willoughby analyzed the causes of political 
unrest in Mexico under the Diaz regime. In a letter to his 
47 Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern 
1913-1921 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), 
Arthur Link, Struggle for Neutrality (Princeton: 
University Press, 1960), pp. 193-196. 
Policy, 
p. 187; 
Princeton 
481ink, Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 267-268. See 
also Curry, Woodrow Wilson, p. 110. 
491 . k 
,lll ' ibid.' pp. 268-269. 
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brother Westel, Willoughby admitted that ''one could read 
between the lines" of the memorandum to see that he was 
in fact drawing a parallel between Mexico's and China's 
experiences with republican government. Willoughby was 
convinced that Yuan wanted to use Diaz's experience as a 
"justification" to make himself "a second Diaz" in China. 50 
In the memorandum, Willoughby noted that Mexico provided 
an "important experiment" in republican government because 
it illustrated the difficulties of establishing a republic 
government in a country with no history of self-rule. 
Dia~ initially was successful because he ended disorder 
in Mexico "with an iron hand" and encouraged the "material 
progress" of the country. Mexico's "rapid development," 
Willoughby reminded Yuan, was due to the "scrupulous care" 
taken by Diaz "to protect foreigners and their investment 
50w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Dec. 10, 22, 1914, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. Porfirio Diaz seized 
power in Mexico in 1876. Although he was always careful 
to maintain the form of Mexico's constitution, he changed 
it to permit his re-election as president for six successive 
terms and generally ruled as a dictator. His attempt to 
imprison a popular rival provoked a violent revolution, 
which forced his resignation in 1911. Although he promoted 
economic development and restored internal order, his 
refusal to abide by the spirit of the constitution angered 
many Mexicans and eventually contributed to his downfall. 
Had Diaz worked to implement republican government, 
historians might have seen him as a progressive leader 
rather than one of a number of dictators (Harold E. Davies, 
Revolutionaries, Traditionalists, and Dictators in Latin 
America [New York: Cooper Square Publications, Inc., 1973], 
pp. 163-171, passim). Sadly, Yuan Shih-k'ai did not accept 
Willoughby's advice. In 1915, his supporters used Diaz as 
a justification for restoration of a monarchy in China. 
51 in the country." 
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Despite promising beginnings, Diaz's regime foundered, 
and Willoughby drew two lessons from its wreckage. Part 
of Mexico's political instability stemmed from Diaz's 
failure to advance "the individual well-being" of the 
Mexican citizens. The concentration of wealth in a few 
hands had undermined the nation's stability. Even the 
United States, Willoughby noted, had undertaken "social 
reforms . . directed towards correcting this evil." 
More importantly, Diaz had been unwilling to square his 
rule with Mexico's commitment to republican government. 
To be sure, the lack of a tradition of self-rule, an 
educated population, and a consensus on the forms of 
government might necessitate strong rule by one person as 
an interim measure; but an autocratic government under a 
republican form either had to create conditions favorable 
to the establishment of a republic or risk instability 
52 
and loss of power. Willoughby's message to Yuan was 
clear: autocratic rule would not bring permanent stability 
to China. A ruler committed to China's best interests 
would work to establish a stable, progressive republic. 
If Yuan received little sympathy from Willoughby for 
the establishment of an autocracy in China, he gained 
51w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Political Conditions 
and Problems in Mexico," Dec. 1914, ibid., Box 5, Folder 42. 
52 Ibid. 
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considerable support for his attack on the Kuomintang 
Party. Addressing himself to the role of political 
parties in modern government, Willoughby again stressed 
the need for Yuan to commit himself to republic government. 
He wrote: 
China has definitely adopted the principle 
of popular government as a political ideal 
towards the achievement of which her efforts 
will be directed.53 
However, Willoughby concluded that China was still in a 
"formative period," not yet completely ready for either 
full popular government or the constructive operation of 
political parties. 5 4 
The task of Yuan Shih-k'ai's government, Willoughby 
asserted, was to develop the conditions necessary for the 
successful operation of a republic. Until consensus was 
reached on the exact form of government for China, and 
until popular government was close to reality, political 
parties should be restricted. Willoughby recognized the 
danger of his advice but emphasized that it was not to 
be construed to mean that public opinion should not be 
heeded by the government. In fact, he encouraged Yuan to 
work for the development of public opinion, to allow for 
"complete publicity" of all official acts, and even to 
permit criticism of the government. Government, he argued, 
53w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Place of Political 
Parties in a Constitutional Government," Dec. 1914, ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
~ 
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should be accountable to the people and open in all its 
dealing with them "to lessen the dangers inherent in the 
centralization of power. 115 5 
Both the memorandum on Mexico and the memorandum on 
political parties demonstrated Willoughby's desire for 
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eventual republican government in China, but both expressed 
his conviction that China in 1914 was not ready for such 
a governmental system. In his memorandum on political 
parties, Willoughby listed the conditions he deemed 
critical for the operation of popular government: a 
homogenous population, a degree of national feeling, basic 
agreement on the form of government, respect for legal 
authority, experience in self-government, and freedom of 
public expression. These conditions did not yet exist 
. Ch" 56 in ina. In this context, Willoughby shared Goodnow's 
appraisal of political conditions in China, and, like 
Goodnow, he wanted a strong central government to serve as 
a transition to the establishment of a republic. 
In conclusion, Willoughby's opinions on China's 
government, particularly on the role of political parties, 
were clearly influenced by his experience in Puerto Rico, 
to which he often referred in his memoranda. He believed 
that political parties in Puerto Rico were irresponsible 
55 Ibid. 
56
rbid. 
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factions, serving more to disrupt the government than to 
provide a means of popular expression. Furthermore, he 
associated parties with the spoils system, which he 
regarded as a threat to efficient, scientific government.57 
Willoughby did not quarrel with a party's active 
formulation and expression of public opinion, but he 
believed that the execution of policy should be left to 
trained experts who would act impartially in the public's 
interests. Curbing the excesses of parties did not 
preclude progress towards popular government but enhanced 
it. Both in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, military 
governments had provided an orderly, stable environment 
for the development of popular government. A similar type 
of government, firm but not repressive, would provide the 
stability needed in China for the development of truly 
republican institutions. 58 Unfortunately for Willoughby, 
Yuan Shih-k'ai had no desire to nurture these conditions 
for a successful republic, and his efforts to steer China 
in that direction had little effect. 
57 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER III 
PLANS FOR AN EFFICIENT CHINA 
William Willoughby knew at the time of his arrival in 
Peking that the establishment of a strong national govern-
ment was crucial to the creation of a modern China. Thus, 
as his memoranda on Diaz of Mexico and the role of political 
parties indicated, he was not opposed to the concentration 
of power in Yuan Shih-k'ai's hands, as long as the president 
remained committed to republican principles. If Yuan 
Shih-k'ai successfully established Peking's control of 
the country, Willoughby reasoned, he could then begin work 
on the reforms Willoughby considered most important for 
China's development: a complete reorganization of her 
civil service, audit and budget procedures, and taxation 
system. Events, however, soon forced Willoughby to postpone 
his work. In the opening weeks of 1915, both he and the 
Chinese were preoccupied with rumors of a restoration of 
the monarchy and feverish consideration of the Twenty-
One Demands. 
In August, 1914, the Council of State announced that 
the country needed a new presidential election law to 
repair "defects" in the election procedure established by 
the provisional constitution. In December, Yuan Shih-k'ai 
promulgated the new law, which lengthened the president's 
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term of office from five to ten years and set no limits 
on the number of terms the president could serve. If, at 
the end of his term, the Council of State decided that 
internal conditions were unsuitable for an election, the 
president could continue in office without the formality 
of an election. If the Council decided that the country 
was stable and elections could take place, a one-hundred 
member electoral college would elect the president from a 
list of three candidates chosen by the incumbent. 1 
This procedure virtually assured that Yuan Shih-k'ai 
could serve as president for as many terms as he wished 
and could even designate his son as his successor. Since 
the president appointed the Council of State and had 
filled it with his supporters, it was highly doubtful 
that the Council would refuse to follow his wishes in 
deciding to hold an election. Since the Council of State 
appointed at least fifty members of the electoral college, 
even an election would result in Yuan's continuance in 
office. If he wished to name his son as his successor, he 
could accomplish this by placing his son's name on the 
list of candidates and then choosing the proper electors 
2 for the electoral college. 
Willoughby swiftly assessed the significance of this 
1 w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the New Presidential 
Election Law," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 42, 
Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary. 
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diunce in the election procedure. To his brother Westel, 
he wrote that the law "was as remarkable a state paper 
3.S you have ever read." In effect, Yuan claimed the 
presidency through "designation by the late dynasty rather 
than Lo election by the people." Willoughby was now 
convinced that the new election law was a prelude to 
restoring the monarchy. But because others in Peking saw 
no signs of imminent restoration, he wrote to Westel that 
he might have overestimated the importance of the new 
election procedures. Despite his reservations, Willoughby 
cautiously prepared a memorandum on the new law, fully 
aware that Yuan might be using his foreign advisers to 
give the change legitimacy.3 
In light of Willoughby's suspicions, his memorandum 
on the presidential election law was remarkably free of 
criticism. He made no suggestions for alteration or repeal 
but stressed that the change might enable China to maintain 
stability and prepare her for popular government. The 
removal of the succession to the presidency from the 
"intrigue" of parties and factions, he thought, might 
well be essential in the transition to a republic. "In 
the first enthusiasm for popular government," he wrote, 
not enough care had been taken to protect China from the 
threat of internal upheaval. A strong executive could 
3w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Jan. 7, 27, 1915, ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 35. 
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organize an administrative system in which "merit and 
efficiency" rather than "political considerations," 
might determine appointments and promotions. Summing up 
his case for the law, Willoughby noted that stability and 
sound administration were ''of especial value during a 
transition period such as the one through which China is 
now passing. 114 
At the conclusion of his memorandum, Willoughby turned 
from the advantages to the disadvantages inherent in a 
highly centralized decision-making process. There was 
always a danger, he stressed, that great power could be 
used "for purposes other than the promotion of the public 
welfare," and that the "political aspirations" of the people 
could be crushed. Such dangers could be avoided if the 
government continued to be accountable to the people, 
protected "free discussion of political matters," and 
established "efficiency and honesty in the administration 
of public affairs. 115 
Reminding Yuan that China's constitution gave 
sovereignty not to the executive but to the people, 
Willoughby called for "complete publicity" of all actions 
and sound fiscal management to insure good government and 
prepare the Chinese for "larger participation" in "public 
4willoughby, "Memorandum on the New Presidential 
Election Law." 
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affairE:>." J\ceountabili ty, Willoughby argued, would even 
be politically expedient, since it would effectively 
d i ~rn rm go v er nm en t c r i t i c s . A f t er sub t 1 y warning Yuan 
Shih-k 'ai that abuse of power would undermine his govern-
merit, Willoughby concluded on a positive note: 
Experience furnishes abundance of proof 
that as much depends upon the spirit and 
manner in which a political system is 6 
operated as upon its technical provisions. 
Willoughby sent a copy of the memorandum to Westel, 
who was then at Johns Hopkins and in close communications 
with Goodnow. He had emphasized the positive benefits of 
a strong executive, he confided, because he did not want 
to offend Yuan or place a stamp of approval upon despotism. 
However, on the same day, he wrote Goodnow that Yuan would 
be dissatisfied with his cautious endorsement of the law: 
What the President wanted, of course, was 
a defense of this act which he could publish. 
I think it quite doubtful whether he will 
care to publish my paper.7 
The conditions under which Willoughby wrote the 
memorandum revealed the difficulties he faced in influencing 
China's development in any meaningful sense. He knew that 
Yuan sought his advice as a justification because the 
memorandum was requested after the new law was promulgated. 
7 W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Jan. 27, 1915, ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 35; and to Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, Ja~7, 
1915, Manuscript Collection, Johns Hopkins University Library. 
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Nevertheless, Willoughby remained committed to the es-
tablishment of a stable China and the development of 
conditions leading to a republican form of government. 
China's constitutional problems, however, faded in 
importance as tensions between China and Japan reached the 
flash point. In January, 1915, Japan presented her Twenty-
One Demands, which posed a serious threat to China's 
sovereignty. The Demands were presented in five groups, 
all of which gave Japan predominance in determining China's 
economic, political, and military affairs. Of the groups, 
the fifth was the most important, because it would 
virtually have transformed China into a protectorate of 
Japan. The Japanese insisted upon total secrecy of the 
true nature of the demands, particularly that of the fifth 
8 group. 
Had the Chinese not leaked a copy of the actual demands 
to diplomats and newsmen, Japan's attempt to conceal their 
contents might have succeeded. 9 As soon as American 
Minister Paul S. Reinsch and Charge E. T. Williams learned 
of the real version, they recognized the threat to the 
Open Door. Reinsch advised Yuan to consider each demand 
separately in negotiations with Japan--in effect, to 
8
rien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1969), pp. 102-104. 
9 Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1960), p. 191. 
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~; tu 11 f o r t i me . 1 O I t w a s from Re in sch rather than the 
Chinese that Willoughby first learned of the demands, 
and Willoughby, like Reinsch, regarded Japan's actions 
with grave suspicion. 
The reasons for this suspicion lay at least in part 
in his concern over the "real motives" behind the Twenty-
One Demands. Willoughby regarded with skepticism Japan's 
claim that she was defending China against rapacious 
western nations. If Japan had China's best interests at 
heart, he wrote, she would not have treated the Chinese 
with "studied arrogance" and threatened her national 
sovereignty. Willoughby was convinced that Japan sought 
to be "not merely the leader of Asia but the master." 
Whatever Japan's motives, the presentation of the Twenty-
One Demands had given notice to the world that Japan sought 
hegemony in Asia. The "yellow peril" was not yet imminent, 
but Willoughby cautioned that Japan's actions had raised 
11 
the "great question of the East versus the West." 
Not long after presentation of the demands, Yuan 
Shih-k'ai turned to Willoughby for help in the crisis. He 
first requested a memorandum on the "correctness" of the 
10
raul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1922), pp. 129-130, 
132-133. See also Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 192-193. 
11w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 15, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. In this letter, Willoughby 
revealed that his information on the Twenty-One Demands came 
from Reinsch and American journalist Frederick Moore. 
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presentation. Although he was puzzled by the purpose of 
Yuan's request, Willoughby turned out a vigorous de-
nunciation of the Japanese minister to China. The 
prc0cntation was not only "insulting" and deceiving, but 
12 
violated proper protocol. Of more importance was Yuan's 
request in March that Willoughby write an article on the 
Twenty-One Demands which could be published in the United 
States to win American support for China. 
Willoughby was quite willing to write the article. 
In fact, he had hoped that Yuan would seek his advice and 
in late March had even offered to act as an emissary 
lJ between the American Legation and the Chinese government. 
Willoughby, like Reinsch and Charg~ d'Affairs E. T. 
Williams, was very much concerned that the State Depart-
ment had not grasped the seriousness of Japan's demands. 
To Goodnow, Willoughby wrote that Secretary of State Bryan 
was too easily deceived by Japanese assurances of safety 
14 for the Open Door. To his brother, he confided, "Bryan 
is looked upon as an innocent child in their [the Japanese] 
12w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Correctness of 
the Procedure of the Japanese Minister in Presenting Certain 
Demands of his Government Directly to the President of 
China," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 42. 
l3w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 29, 1915, ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 35. 
l4w. F. Willoughby to Frank J. Goodnow, Mar. 18, 1915, 
Goodnow Papers. 
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15 hancls." Consequently, Willoughby urged Goodnow to make 
effective use of the article as a means to influence 
American opinion. He did, however, caution Goodnow not 
to use his name on the article, fearing that the pub-
16 
lication of an adviser's name would anger the Japanese. 
In the memorandum which might have been used as a 
draft for the article, Willoughby vigorously warned his 
American readers that the Japanese had succeeded in 
concealing the gravity of their demands and argued that 
the demands, if accepted, would lead to a loss of Chinese 
sovereignty. In a series of rhetorical questions, he 
identified Japan as a threat to reform and progress in 
China and warned all western nations to consider Japan's 
motives for the demands. 17 
Events moved faster than the article. Although Goodnow 
received it in April or May, it came too late for any 
significant impact on American opinion. Goodnow informed 
Willoughby that the Chinese minister in Washington had 
shown him a copy of the Japanese demands early in 1915, 
and he had informed Bryan of their significance: 
15w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 15, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers~ Box 5, Folder 35. 
16w. F. Willoughby to Goodnow, Mar. 18, 1915, Goodnow 
Papers. 
17w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Japanese Demands 
on China," n. d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder ~-2. 
. in case China acceded to these demands 
its independence would be seriously impaired 
and the commercial interests of Americans in 
the East would be affected.18 
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By March, Bryan began to recognize the need to defend the 
Open Door against Japanese pressure. Although he probably 
conceded too much to Japan, the United States and Great 
Britain did pressure the Japanese into withdrawing the 
fifth group of demands in May. 19 
Despite the success of the United States and Great 
Britain in softening some of the demands, it was clear 
that Japan had a fairly free hand in China as long as the 
war in Europe lasted. The United States had no intention 
of intervening militarily to preserve China's territorial 
integrity, and no European power could afford military 
intervention. In President Wilson's analysis, China was 
too weak internally to protect her sovereignty, and until 
China achieved some degree of stability she was fair game 
for any country capable of exploiting her weakness. 20 
As the weeks passed, Willoughby reached the same 
conclusion. Faced with desperate internal weakness, 
China had three options: she could give in to Japan, and 
18 Frank J. Goodnow to W. F. Willoughby, Mar. 2J, 1915, 
Goodnow Papers. 
19Arthur Link, Struggle for Neutrality (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 294-297. 
20Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, p. 129. 
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become for Japan what India was to England; she could be 
c:ut up into "spheres of influence," each administered by 
:1 foreign country; or she could give foreigners control 
of China's government services, as had already been done 
with the salt gabelle and the Chinese customs . 21 service. 
The last option seemed most promising to Willoughby. 
Un 1 e ~:; [) C h i n e s e a f fa i r s we re " ad mini s t e re d by out s i de he 1 p " 
us the United States had done in the Philippines and Puerto 
Hico, China <.!ould never hope to preserve her integrity and 
independence. Currency, taxation, and banking systems 
had to be reformed for China's government to survive, and 
only foreign administration could accomplish the reforms. 
Fulling back on a comparison familiar to American progres-
sives, Willoughby remarked that China was like a bankrupt 
firm. To achieve stability, he suggested that she be put 
through "receivership. 1122 
When Willoughby communicated these options to his 
brother, he was not merely engaging in rhetorical exercise. 
He was trying to effect the third option. From his arrival, 
the Chinese had pressed him for advice on floating a large 
loan for the reorganization of her financial system. With 
the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands, the Chinese 
had grown increasingly desperate for funds and now pressed 
21 w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Feb. 27, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
22 Ibid. 
the loan once again. At the request of President Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, Willoughby wrote a lengthy letter to Goodnow, 
askine him to explore the possibility of a loan with 
commercial bankers in the United States. 23 
In Willoughby's decision to seek a loan lay the 
convergence of many American interests in China. To be 
sure, Willoughby, like his fellow progressives, was 
anxious to secure reform in China and eventually to 
establish a republic there; but to secure the reforms, 
Willoughby turned to American commercial interests. 
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American investment would provide China with stability and 
prosperity, the basis of progressive government. By 
grnr1ting a loan, the United States would block Japan's 
attempts to subvert the Open Door and would encourage 
China to adopt measures to strengthen herself internally--
and make her a receptive market for both goods and ideas. 
In the memorandum to Yuan Shih-k'ai on the loan, 
Willoughby first stressed that the immediate crisis with 
Japan was only the first of a series of confrontations, 
unless China could make meaningful reforms which would 
help her resist Japanese domination. Without reform, 
China could not hope to develop a strong navy or "free 
herself" from a "humiliating" and untrustworthy reliance 
on foreign powers. To develop China, Willoughby proposed 
23w. F. Willoughby to Goodnow, Feb. 22, 1915, Goodnow 
Papers. 
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owcepinp, monetary and fiscal reforms. The reforms, 
however, would be expensive. A loan of at least $100 
million in gold was absolutely necessary. As he 
rcnlistically pointed out, China's tax system could not 
support even the immediate needs of the government; it 
could hardly support major reform. 2 4 
To obtain a loan of that size, China had to turn 
abroad. Willoughby advised Yuan that only the United 
States could offer such a loan, and indeed was the only 
country to which China could safely go. Only the United 
States would refrain from placing China under burdensome 
"political obligations." He wrote: 
The only political interest that the 
United States had in China is that she 
should succeed in her present efforts 
to achieve a strong and stable government.25 
Once he had made his best case for an American loan, 
Willoughby then outlined the conditions of the proposed 
loan for Yuan. In the first place, he warned, the loan 
would have to go towards a sincere reform of banking and 
currency. Since any loan would have to be secured, the 
Chinese tax system needed a complete overhaul to provide 
adequate security. Moreover, Willoughby, convinced that 
24 W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Desirability 
of China Securing a Loan in the United States for the 
Purpose of Accomplishing the Reform of her Currency, Banking, 
and Taxation Systems," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, 
Folder 42. 
25 Ibid. 
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only foreign administration could provide stability in 
China, warned Yuan Shih-k'ai that American bankers might 
well in~dst that "Americans or at least persons in whom 
they have confidence" would be employed by the Chinese "to 
26 
superintend or direct the execution of the reforms." 
Willoughby, of course, was aware that the Chinese 
would be less than receptive to this last condition but, 
ao he wrote to his brother, China needed the loan so 
desperately that she would "pay the price in order to get 
. L "27 1 • Willoughby stressed to Yuan that American 
administrators were no threat to China's sovereignty. 
Turning to the American administration of Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines as examples, he carefully pointed out 
that Americans had worked very hard to turn over adminis-
tration to trained "native inhabitants." In light of 
China's insolvency, Willoughby vigorously asserted that 
"this temporary alienation of control may be wholly good," 
and offered China a chance for progress and stability. 
Warning that bankers considering the loan would be 
skeptical of China's ability to repay, Willoughby repeatedly 
urged Yuan's emissaries to be "frank and fair" in dealing 
28 
with them. Willoughby's insistence on pledges of reform 
27w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Feb. 27, 1915, ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 35. 
28 Willoughby, "Memorandum on Securing a Loan, 11 ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 42. 
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or American control indicated that his faith in the Chinese 
£tbility to achieve stability on their own had been sorely 
tried. 
Although Willoughby wanted very much for the loan to 
be made, he was very skeptical about China's ability to 
secure such a large loan from American bankers. Consequently, 
for either help or reassurance, he floated a trial balloon 
to Reinsch. In March, he wrote to Goodnow that Reinsch 
had responded quite favorably to the loan proposa1. 29 
From Goodnow came still more encouragement. Both B. Howell 
Griswold of Alexander Brown and Sons and President Wilson 
had promised strong support. 30 The exact conditions of the 
loan, however, were a considerable problem, and Goodnow 
ureed Willoughby to begin work on plans satisfactory to 
both the Chinese and the American bankers. 31 
The loan proposal, coming as Japan threatened the 
Open Door, provided Wilson and Reinsch with one method of 
curbing Japanese ambition and extending American influence 
in Asia. Both Wilson and Reinsch were very much in favor 
of American loans and investments in China, for they believed 
29 W. F. Willoughby to Goodnow, Mar. 18, 1915, Goodnow 
Papers. 
JORoy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-
1921 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 149-151. 
JlGoodnow to W. F. Willoughby, May 14, 1915, 
Papers. Both Tien-yi Li and Roy Curry wrote that 
Willoughby suggested the loan to Yuan Shih-k'ai. 
they have confused William F. Willoughby with his 
because Westel was at Johns Hopkins at this time. 
Goodnow 
w. w. 
Apparently 
twin, 
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very otron~ly that financial, commercial, and industrial 
development not only aided China's transformation to a 
modern, progressive nation but contributed to the United 
~tatcs' prosperity as well. 32 But the high hopes for the 
loan faded quickly. Although Wilson endorsed the loan 
proposal, he refused to guarantee that the United States 
{~ o v c r nm c n t w o u 1 d en f o r c e c o 11 e c t i on o f the 1 o an . Faced 
wi Lh Wilson's refusal, worried by China's weakness, and 
preoccupied with the credit demands of the European war, 
American bankers refused to accept the risks associated 
w i tl1 a $1 0 0 mi 11 i on 1 o an . Negotiations for the loan 
collapsed while still in preliminary stages, and with them 
collapsed Willoughby's plans for direct American adminis-
tration of the reforms. 3 3 
The failure to secure the loan dimmed hope for major 
reform in China. From his arrival, Willoughby had been 
anxious to reorganize China's administrative, monetary, 
and fiscal systems. The first major reform was the over-
haul of the land tax, and he had intricately bound the tax 
to the loan negotiations. Willoughby suggested that the 
reorganized land tax be used as security for the loan. 
The loan, then, not only would have strengthened China 
in the face of the Twenty-One Demands but would have acted 
32 Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, pp. 164-
165. 
33Ibid., p. 194; Curry, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 148, 150-
151. 
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a:_; a 1 e v er on Yuan Shih - k ' a i to g u a rant e e ch a ng e . 
The proposal on reform of the land tax submitted to 
Yuan Shih-k'ai early in 1915 was one of Willoughby's most 
lengthy and methodical memoranda, running some eighty 
typewritten pages. Willoughby drew heavily upon his 
experience with Puerto Rico's tax system, and he incorporated 
proposals progressives had favored for the United States. 
The lnnd tax was essentially to be a tax on land value; 
such a tax would be best, Willoughby argued, because land 
vulues remained "comparatively stable" and accrued a 
predictable revenue.34 
Once the type of taxation had been recommended, 
Willoughby put forth a very detailed analysis of how such 
a system should be organized. Deftly tying a well-
administered taxation system to China's progress--and 
Yuan's survival--Willoughby frequently stressed that 
inefficient, unfair assessments and collections encouraged 
opposition and even resistance to the central government. 
An honest, efficient tax system, he reminded Yuan, educated 
the citizenry politically and also secured their loyalty. 35 
To secure a proper administration, Willoughby fell back 
upon his experience as Puerto Rico: in essence, he 
proposed a model civil service system for China. 
34w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Reform of the 
Land Tax System in China," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, 
Folder 42. 
35
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As he outlined the duties of each tax official, 
WlllouGhby insisted that only independent, permanent 
sµccinlists--the efficient, apolitical experts so admired 
by [JroGressives--assess and collect the land tax. Willoughby 
here w a ~J adamant . The tax collectors would have to be 
v<u> L ly different f ram the pro vi nc ial rogues previously 
employed, unless China wanted to risk popular unrest. 
NuLurully, the tax service would be organized by grades, 
wiLh promotions based strictly on merit. Such honest, 
cf'f'icient, and fair administration of taxation would 
surely win support for the government, and still more 
~;upport would accrue if the taxation plan were effected by 
u vote of the provisional national assembly instead of 
presidential order. Hoping to steer Yuan Shih-k'ai towards 
the adoption of republicanism, Willoughby stressed that 
the endorsement of this body would mean that "the people 
themselves, acting through their legal representatives, 
hud reached a determination to put their financial system 
upon a sounder basis. 1136 This approval would not only 
curb opposition but would surely enhance the legitimacy of 
Yuan's government. 
It is difficult to determine how much Willoughby knew 
of China's traditions and history when he made his suggestions 
for reform of her land tax and administrative system. 
64 
AdmltLcdly he too often made faulty comparisons of China 
with Puerto Hico, ignoring the very real differences in 
population and culture. Too often, the Puerto Rican 
"native inhabitants" seemed all too similar to Chinese 
natives, perhaps a reflection of racism on Willoughby's 
part. But he certainly knew that the Manchu dynasty and 
its predecessors had operated an elaborate civil service 
system with competitive examinations and graded ranks. 
Too, he probably knew that China had continued the use of 
a censorate after the end of the Manchu dynasty to expose 
wrongdoing or weakness on the part of government officials. 
The µrovisional constitution of May 1, 1914 had even 
established an administrative court to adjudicate disputes 
over government rulings. What is clear, however, is that 
Willoughby had little faith in the efficacy of Yuan Shih-
k'ui's administrative system and was prepared to replace 
it with a civil service modelled upon the administrative 
systems of western nations. 37 He might have used the 
western model because he was so familiar with the operation 
of civil service systems in the United States, Great 
Britain, France, and Germany. On the other hand, his 
willingness to introduce a western system into China might 
well have stemmed from a belief that western institutions 
were superior and offered a model for the Chinese to 
37
Franklin Haun, Central Government of China, 1912-1918 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), pp. 102-lOJ. 
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imitute. 
Willoughby's proposal for land tax reform apparently 
won enough support to be carried beyond the memorandum, 
becuuse Yuan Shih-k'ai wanted him to stay on beyond his 
term us adviser to overhaul the land tax system. Willoughby 
dld not particularly want the appointment because he did 
not wish to remain in China beyond the end of his term. 
Moreover, the plan to put the land tax under his adminis-
tratio11 ran into stiff Japanese and Russian opposition, 
probably because they feared increased American influence 
i Il 38 Yuan's government. 
Throughout 1915 and 1916, Willoughby wrote three 
additional memoranda recommending administrative and 
fiscal reforms, and these were largely an extension of 
the principles he had stressed in the longer land tax 
proposal. They were more of a technical nature, concerning 
the establishment of various administrative services, and 
the appeals to political expediency were not so prominent. 
The memoranda did, however, stress the progressive principles 
Willoughby had tried to effect in Puerto Rico and in the 
United States. 
The document on the organization of a civil service 
system concentrated primarily on procedure, not philosophy, 
and repeated many of the recommendations presented in the 
38w. F. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, May, 1915, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder J6. 
land Lax proposal. As in previous memoranda, Willoughby 
aq~ued Urn. t reform was worthless unless China created an 
efficient administration to staff her government depart-
men ts. He followed with remarkably detailed advice on 
promotions, compensation, and tenure within the service. 
Throughout, Willoughby warned the Chinese not to repeat 
American mistakes: partisanship or favoritism must not 
impede the operations of an independent, professional 
. 39 
service. 
The structure of Willoughby's civil service would 
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have seemed familiar to an imperial statesman. The imperial 
bureaucracy had provided safeguards against corruption, 
promotions based on merit and seniority, competitive 
examinations, and ratings and grades. Also, both systems 
were designed to promote harmony among different elements 
of society. However, the nature of the harmony and the 
means by which men would achieve it differed greatly. 
In China harmony was not achieved through a balance of the 
interests of entrepreneurs, citizens, and labor, but through 
obedience to the social prescriptions set down in Confucian 
classics and histories. The scholar official of Confucian 
tradition had only one essential administrative goal: to 
39w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Some Factors 
Involved in Securing Efficiency in the Organization of 
the Personnel in Government Service," n.d., ibid., Box 5, 
Folder 42. 
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rentore a tranquil, harmonious society.40 To govern 
effectively, the scholar-official had to study the classics 
and inculcate in the people the rules of propriety which 
governed the relationships of men.4 1 
In practice, a number of realities scarred this ideal 
administrative system. For example, society was supposedly 
characterized by close interpersonal relationships, but 
the tasks of government--that is, tax collection or law 
enforeement--forced the scholar away from a humanistic 
relationship with the people. Too, in spite of all their 
;;tudy and effort on examinations the officials frequently 
proved to be corrupt and arrogant.4 2 Perhaps a more 
serious problem for the Confucian scholars was inherent in 
their utopian vision of society, because it forced the 
scholar officials to look back to an ancient order. The 
vision not only made them blind to changes in society 
wrought by western technology and ideas but led the scholars 
to become entrenched defenders of despotic autocracy. 
The concern over maintenance of a stable social order lent 
itself to the acceptance of autocracy as natural and elevated 
40c. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureau-
cratic Behavior," in Confucianism in Action, eds. David S. 
Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford1 Stanford University 
Press, 1959), p. 1J8. 
41Arthur F. Wright, 
Civilization (Stanford: 
p. Xl. 
ed., Confucianism and Chinese 
Stanford University Press, 1975), 
4 2c. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureau-
cratic Behavior," pp. 146, 148. 
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cv0ry emperor to the status of a sage. 43 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Confucian 
~;d101ar-burenucrat tradition was under serious attack. The 
0 d10 1 a r s had fa i 1 e d t o main ta i n the o 1 d order w i th " s e 1 f -
~.;trcngthening." The respect for the authority of both 
father and emperor seemed inconsistent with self-government, 
the emancipation of women, and recognition of individual 
ctienity. Indeed, it seemed doubtful that the generalist of 
the Confucian tradition could cope with the demands of a 
teehnolocically advanced, urban, industrial nation. 44 
After Japan defeated China in 1895, steamships, steel, 
and armaments seemed more appropriate topics for study 
than Confucian classics. The scholar K'ang Yu-wei wanted 
to abolish the "eight-legged essay" during the Hundred 
Days reforms, but conservatives permitted no change in 
t he ~; c h o 1 a r t r a d i t i on . In the aftermath of the Boxer 
Rebellion, however, the Manchus abolished the old exami-
nation system and ordered the inclusion of modern topics 
f . t" 45 in ull uture examina ions. 
4 3william T. DeBary, "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-
Confucianism," Nivison and Wright, eds., Confucianism in 
Action, pp. 19-23. 
44 rrnmanuel C. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 534; Arthur F. Wright, 
ed., The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versi Ly Press, 1960), p. 18. 
45 Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 446; Haun, Central 
Government, pp. 6-7. 
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Under the provisions of the constitution of 1914, 
Yuun :)hih-k 'ai 31 tered the organization of the old censo'rate 
and added an administrative court. But Yuan personally 
co11Lrolled both the personnel and organization of all 
go v c r rnn c n t age n c i e s , and u n d er hi s d i r e c t i on the ad mini s -
traLive :;ysLem functioned erratically. 46 For example, the 
con~; t L tu ti on provided for a board of audit, but the board 
acc:omplished nothing. In theory, Yuan Shih-k'ai prepared 
a budeeL, but in practice, he spent funds as he saw fit. 47 
When Willoughby proposed reorganization of the land 
Lax, the civil service, and later, the financial system, 
he; wfrn in effect attempting to fill an institutional vacuum. 
He wan nut, however, free of remnants of China's traditional 
bureaucratic system. The Confucian order was under attack, 
to be sure; but many Chinese still adhered to Confucian 
pri11ciplcs, and some wanted Confucianism established as a 
national religion. Yuan Shih-k'ai used Confucian rites to 
0trcnr,then his claim on China's throne, and bureaucrats 
of Confucian persuasion still retained posts in his 
48 govcrnmcn t. 
'rhc bureaucracy that Willoughby proposed would have 
46 lloun, Central Government, p. 89. 
4 7 Ibid . , p. 99. 
48Tse-tsung Chow, "The Anti-Confician Movement in 
Early Hepublican China," in Wright, ed., The Confucian 
Persuasion, pp. 290-291; Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Sh1h-k'a1, 
2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 208. 
·l ,. 
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b c c n v a [~ t 1 y d i f f e rent from th a t of tr ad i t i on a 1 Chi n a . The 
impartial expert, a specialist, would have had little in 
common with the generalist of imperial days. Instead of 
wurkinr, for the restoration of a society characterized by 
hlcrurchy and stability, Willoughby's bureaucrat used his 
~; I) c c :i a 1 i 2 c d know 1 e d g e t o p r om o t e p o 1 i t i c a 1 d em o c r a c y . 
The primary function of his bureaucrat was harmonization 
of' the interests of citizens, labor, and business, not the 
rc~;torution of an ancient utopia. As in the Confucian 
tradition, the bureaucrat acted in the people's best 
interests, but under Willoughby's plan, the government--
11nd ultimately the bureaucrat--were accountable to the 
ciLizenn. 
Willoughby did not believe that the citizens of China 
were prepared to define their own interests through self-
r,overnmcnt. Previously he had written that conditions in 
China were not yet suitable for the establishment of 
political parties or legislative bodies. Instead, he 
urged China's leadership to develop conditions under which 
self-government could exist, and the bureaucracy was a key 
element in developing these conditions. The bureaucrat, 
like his Confucian counterpart, would teach the people by 
the efficient completion of his tasks that their government 
was legitimate, stable, and capable of protecting their 
interests. When the people recognized the authority of 
their government, national leaders could then encourage 
the establishment of local, provincial, and national 
t' 
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nLlLlemblies. 49 Instead of protecting the old order, 
Willour;hby's bureaucrat prepared China for massive social 
und political change. 
In short, then, Willoughby's plan for a civil service 
wuLl not so revolutionary in its structure as in its 
imp1ications. If his plan was put into effect, China 
would have to adopt republican principles--principles very 
much incon[>i stent with a hierarchical social structure. 
In truth, it is doubtful that the Chinese could have 
adopted his proposals. As Willoughby realized, the Chinese 
had not yet reached a consensus on the type of government 
they wished to have, and the "common man" had not yet 
developed either the capability or the desire to exercise 
liis political rights. 50 A tradition of authoritarian rule 
nnd u recent history of internal disorder proved to be 
rocky ground for the growth of republican ideas. 
As part of his plan to reorganize China's fiscal 
affairs, Willoughby also recommended the establishment of 
a central board of financial control to administer China's 
budr,et. This recommendation was not entirely new to 
China. During the Hundred Days reforms of 1898, reformers 
had recommended the publication of a budget, and a decade 
49w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Adjustment of 
the Financial Relations Between the Central Government, 
the Provinces, and the Local Governing Bodies," n.d., 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 42. 
5° Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 2nd ed., p. 211. 
,: 
72 
1 a u~r, the Manchus promised to implement a budget system. 
'J' h c (~ o n :3 L i t u L i o n o f t he r e p u b 1 i c a 1 s o e s t a b 1 i s h e d a b u d g e t , 
buL Yuan Shih-k'ai had never prepared an effective 
51 
one. 
Lr1 hi:; memorandum, Willoughby urged the Chinese to prepare 
b u d f~ c t : ; , a u d i t a c c o u n t s , an d p u b 1 i s h p r op e r r e p or t s . 
When properly ndministered, he argued, budget and audit 
:] y : ; L em:__; er w b 1 c d the pr e s i de n t to ex e r c i s e c 1 o s e super vi s i on 
o v e r h i ~' e x cc u t i v e department s . Furthermore, if the central 
board drafted and enforced regulations for the financial 
admini :;tra Lion of the provinces and localities, Yuan Shih-
k '<1i could strengLhen his control of the hinterland. 52 
In his last memorandum on administrative reform, 
WillcJugl1by explained in more detail his plans to extend 
Lhe budr,et and audit systems to the provincial and local 
f~ o v e r nm e n L s . His plans focused on a significant problem 
in China, because the provincial governments were tied 
only tenuously to Peking. Yuan Shih-k'ai held the provinces 
in cheek more by his decision to appoint loyal military 
governor~ than by claims to the loyalty of the people. 
Certainly the people of far-removed provinces had few 
eovernment services to bind them daily to Peking. The ex-
tension of the financial system, Willoughby reasoned, would 
provide a method of placing China under the direction of a 
51 Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 446; Houn, Central 
Government, p. 99. 
• 2 
J Willoughby, "Memorandum on Adjustment of Financial 
Helutions. 11 
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d . . t• t 53 c:entral a rnirnstra ive sys em. 
Willoughby first recommended that the central govern-
mcnt uppoint administrators to supervise local and 
provincial finances. The central board should then grant 
each locality and province a share of general tax revenue 
for 1ocal use. Efficient, responsible administration of 
locul and provincial finances would reinforce the legiti-
macy and authority of all levels of government. Then, when 
Lhc people recognized the legitimacy of their government 
and rc[_;pec ted its authority, officials could allow popular 
µurtieiputior1 in political organizations and eventually 
in aLJsemblies. Willoughby wrote: 
If China is to bring into existence a form 
of government under which larger and larger 
participation in the conduct of government 
affairs is to be conferred on the people, 
or they acquire the capacity for the proper 
exercise of political power, a beginning 
must be made in the field of local and pro-
vincial government.54 
Because Willoughby did not define precisely either 
the powers of the local and provincial authorities or the 
exact share of revenue they would receive, it is difficult 
to evaluate the effect of this proposal. Certainly too 
great a degree of financial autonomy risked further 
disintegration of relations between Peking and the provinces. 
Willoughby asserted that under his plan the central government 
53 rbid. 
54 rbid. 
;l 
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retained enough control over the localities to prevent 
such disintegration. No taxes could be levied or money 
borrowed without permission of the central government; the 
"chief executive" of each province had to submit a budget 
for Peking's review; and finally, travelling examiners 
55 
and auditors could inspect provincial and local records. 
Despite his realistic assessment of the need for 
central control of China's finances, Willoughby's plans 
for the implementation of a budget system were probably 
too optimistic. The specialist's traditionally low status 
in the imperial Chinese bureaucracy, the widespread 
corruption in Yuan's regime, and the existence of nearly 
autonomous dictatorships in many of China's provinces 
presented virtually insurmountable obstacles to the estab-
56 lishment of a properly administered budget. Willoughby 
knew that the recruitment and training of an efficient 
staff of specialists would be very difficult, but he 
remained hopeful. If China's leadership seriously tackled 
reform, he wrote Westel, progress could be made towards an 
efficient administration of her affairs. 57 
55 Ibid. 
56
ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 2nd ed., p. 211; C. K. Yang, 
"Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior," 
p. 138. 
57w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 26, 1916, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
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Willoughby was anxious to achieve in China a reform 
that he and other advocates of scientific management had 
not yet been able to accomplish in the United States. 
While he served on the Taft Commission, he recommended 
that the nation adopt a budget system, but Congress did 
not act on his recommendation until 1921. In later years, 
he regarded his role in the establishment of the Bureau 
of the Budget as the most significant achievement of his 
life. 58 His plan to implement a similar budget system in 
China is significant to the evaluation of his work there, 
for it reveals why Willoughby, from his arrival in Peking, 
stressed administrative reform over constitutional reform. 
In Willoughby's mind, China faced several inter-
related problems, and he took very seriously his responsi-
bility as an adviser to help China overcome them. One 
problem for both China and the United States was the 
maintenance of China's integrity. To resist pressure from 
Japan or Russia, which wished to make substantial 
encroachments on her territory, China needed a strong 
government and financial solvency. To achieve a strong 
government capable of resisting both external pressure 
and internal disintegration, Yuan Shih-k'ai had to develop 
some link between the people and the central government 
in Peking. In short, both the maintenance of the Open 
58 rnterview with William W. Willoughby, Bohun Farm, 
Mathews, Virginia, July 31, 1974. 
Door and the development of self-government in China 
deper1ded upon the maintenance of a stable government. 
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To achieve stability, Willoughby turned not to 
constitutional models but to American progressive ideas. 
For Willouehby, the administrator, the impartial expert in 
an efficient administrative system, was to provide the 
stability China needed. The administrative systems--
particularly taxation, which touched every citizen--would 
provide the essential link between the people and the 
government, an avenue of communication and service. The 
stability provided by the civil service, working within 
well-organized government agencies, would provide an 
atmosphere suitable for the growth of republicanism and 
incidentally for American political, social, and economic 
influence. The administrator, armed with the techniques 
of scientific management, became the means of establishing 
a modern, efficient China. 
By the spring of 1915, however, Willoughby had grown 
discouraged by China's inability to reorganize her govern-
ment. He then had concluded that either China had to 
provide the experts to aid her transition to a modernized, 
western, republican nation or had to submit to "receivership." 
Yuan Shih-k'ai's acceptance of almost all of the Twenty-One 
Demands brought a break in the tension between Japan and 
China, and in June, Goodnow and Westel Willoughby were due 
to arrive in Peking. Although they were not always 
consistent with China's traditions, Willoughby's suggestions 
bad been well-received by some Chinese officials, who 
believed that his memoranda on fiscal reform would be a 
"£reat aid." But in late summer, Willoughby's attention 
59 
would turn from reform to monarchy. 
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59w. F. Willoughby to Westel, May 13, 1915, Willoughb~ 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MAN WHO WOULD BE KING 
In May, 1915, the Chinese government accepted most 
of the demands Japan had made, and for the moment the 
crisis between the two nations passed. Willoughby was 
convinced that little had been resolved between China and 
Japan that spring. To his sister Alice he wrote that Japan 
would continue "to push her claims further as the oppor-
tunity presents itself. 111 Nevertheless, tension had 
lessened as summer approached, and Willoughby was now 
preoccupied with the impending visit from Dr. Goodnow 
2 
and his brother and close confidant, Westel. 
According to Goodnow's contract, he was to return to 
3 
Peking at Yuan Shih-k'ai's request in the summer of 1915. 
When President Yuan had extended an invitation to return, 
Goodnow had accepted and arrived in Peking in July. Westel 
apparently had no specific duties but had come with Goodnow 
1william F. Willoughby to Alice, May 20, 1915, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35, Earl Gregg Swem Library, 
College of William and Mary. 
2w. F. Willoughby to Westel, May 27, 1915, ibid. 
JSee copy of W. F. Willoughby's contract with China's 
government, ibid., Box 1, Folder 2. 
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to visit his brother and see first-hand conditions in China. 
'fhe situation could hardly be described as placid. Since 
the promulgation of the new presidential election law in 
cianuury, signs had appeared in Peking that an attempt to 
restore the monarchy was imminent. 4 Although Yuan pro-
claimed loyalty to the republic, and American Minister 
Puul Reinsch discounted the rumors, many foreigners in the 
Legation Quarter believed that the days of the republic 
5 
were numbered. 
Soon after entering the rumor-filled capital, Goodnow 
turned his attention to the problems of China's constitutional 
development. Like Reinsch, Wilson, and the Willoughbys, 
Goodnow hoped that China would follow the American example, 
but he also recognized that she was not ready for either 
6 
sweeping reform or republican government. Goodnow in 
particular contended that a nation could not simply adopt 
whatever form of government its leaders desired. The 
government had to reflect that nation's history and culture. 7 
4Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1960), pp. 213-215. 
5
rbid., p. 215. See also Paul S. Reinsch, An American 
Diplomar-ln China (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, 
and Company, 1922), pp. 171-172. 
6 Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), p. 123. 
7 Noel Pugach, "Embarrassed Monarchist: Frank J. Goodnow 
and Constitutional Development in China, 1913-1916," Pacific 
Historical Review, 42 (Nov. 1973), 505-506. See also 
Reinsch, An American Diplomat, p. 46. 
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ch-t nn, with its tradition of authoritarian rule, could 
not develop into a model republic without a transition 
period. 
Because he believed that China was not ready to 
transform western political theory into a workable, stable 
~overnment, Goodnow had not condemned Yuan's harsh treatment 
of the Kuomintang or his dissolution of the Chinese 
8 
national assembly. Like Reinsch, W. W. Rockhill, and 
later Willoughby, Goodnow was convinced that China's 
r,reatest need was stability, and Yuan, even with tendencies 
towards absolutism, provided a measure of stability for 
China. 9 
However, Goodnow still kept sight of an eventual 
republican government for China. Far from extending Yuan's 
absolutism, Goodnow had tried in 1913-1914 to steer Yuan 
towards recognition of basic personal freedom, respect for 
his opposition and restoration of a legislature with 
. . d 10 11m1te power. The legislature was included in the May, 
1914 provisional constitution, but Goodnow knew its 
inclusion was little more than window-dressing to achieve 
f f . t• 11 support rom ore1gn na ions. 
8 Pugach, "Embarrassed Monarchist," 507. 
9
rbid., 510. 
lOibid., 507. 
11 Ibid.' 504, 509. 
,, 
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When Goodnow arrived in Peking, Yuan Shih-k'ai 
requested a memorandum discussing the relative merits of 
various types of governments for China. Although Goodnow 
had been pessimistic in 1914 about his chances for affecting 
12 
meaningful change, he submitted the memorandum in August. 
Normally such a memorandum would have caused little or no 
notice in the press, but this document gave Yuan Shih-k'ai 
and the supporters of the monarchy the legitimacy the 
movement needed to gain public attention and support. 13 
Goodnow began the memorandum with descriptions of the 
republican governments in the American and European states. 
The experiences of these nations, he wrote, proved that 
the most important condition for maintaining republican 
government--the stable succession to executive power--
was best solved by a nation with a "high degree of 
intelligence," and a tradition of participatory government. 
In nations without such a tradition, failure to solve the 
problem of providing an orderly succession led frequently to 
anarchy, disorder, and dictatorship. Such disorder in 
China would surely lead to intervention by foreign powers, 
he warned, for disorder threatened the "economic interests 
of the European world. 111 4 
12 Ibid., 510. 
l3Reinsch, An American Diplomat, p. 47. 
14
coodnow memorandum, in United States Department of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924), 
pp. 57-58. 
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China then faced great danger to her internal stabili-
Ly and national sovereignty if this "great problem of 
presidential succession" remained "unsolved." In light 
of the a~itation for the reestablishment of the monarchy, 
Goodnow then drew a dangerous and puzzling conclusion to 
hi~; discussion of republicanism: 
It is of course not susceptible of doubt that 
a monarchy is better suited than a republic for 
China. China's history and traditions, her 
social and economic conditions, her relations 
with foreign powers all make probable that the 
country would develop that constitutional 
government which it must develop if it is to 
preserve its independence as a state more 
easily as a monarchy than as a republic.15 
Thiu conclusion was qualified by the assertion that the 
monarchy could be established if no opposition to it 
appeared and that change was unlikely to bring ''any lasting 
benefit to China" unless it was clearly a constitutional 
h . th 1 t. . t. 16 h l" f. t. manure y w1 popu ar par icipa ion. T ese qua 1 ica ions, 
however, were ignored by the Peace Planning Society, which 
Yuan's supporters formed to win support for the monarchy. 
It freely exploited both the memorandum and Goodnow's 
position as an adviser to prove that a monarchy was best 
f()r Chl·na. 17 G d ' 1 t t t th h 0 d oo now s a er pro es s an is memoran um 
had been misunderstood had little effect. 
15
rbi"d., 57 58 pp. - . 
16 Ibid., p. 58. 
17Ch' en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 204-205. 
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Goodnow's purpose in writing this memorandum has never 
been made clear. Jerome Ch'en, in his biography of Yuan 
Dhih-k 'ai, has 
~> u c h a " n a i v e " 
Paul Reinsch, 
remarked that the reason why Goodnow made 
18 
statement remains "a historical mystery." 
the American minister, offered this explanation 
for the memorandum: 
Advisers had been so generally treated as 
academic ornaments that Dr. Goodnow did not 
suspect that in this case the memorandum 
would be made the starting point and basis 
of positive action.19 
There is certainly an element of truth in Reinsch's appraisal, 
for Goodnow probably did not realize that the Peace Planning 
Society was in fact using his genuine concern for China to 
20 
win approval for its plans. 
However, historian Noel Pugach recently has argued 
LhaL Goodnow was not merely writing philosophically about 
government alternatives when he drafted the memorandum. 
During 1914, Goodnow feared that Yuan Shih-k'ai was moving 
towards autocracy, and this unease hastened his departure 
C 
. 21 from hina. Despite his fears of Yuan's intentions and 
his sincere desire for a Chinese republic, Goodnow also 
19 . h Reinsc , An American Diplomat, p. 17J. 
20
rbid., p. 47. 
21 Pugach, "Embarrassed Monarchist," 513. 
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genuinely feared that Yuan's death would leave China in 
chaos. Consequently, he wrote the memorandum not blindly 
but in hope that a constitutional monarchy would give 
22 China the stability it needed for progress and reform. 
Willoughby's correspondence gives support to Pugach's 
analysis. Willoughby had written his brother in January 
about the implications of the presidential election law 
and asked that this information be passed along to Goodnow. 
He also sent Westel both news clippings and his memorandum 
23 
about the law. When Goodnow arrived, Willoughby was 
ill with a respiratory ailment and had been out of contact 
with developments in Peking. Nevertheless, Goodnow knew 
of the monarchial sentiment. To Simon N. D. North of the 
Carnegie Endowment Willoughby wrote that Goodnow "heard 
the matter discussed as soon as he reached Peking." He 
had not consulted about the memorandum, Willoughby reported, 
and added that "it came as quite a surprise to me." He 
was convinced that Goodnow had not volunteered the statement 
but that Yuan Shih-k'ai had requested it. Like Reinsch, 
and Pugach, Willoughby believed that Goodnow's good 
intentions had been used by the monarchists. Goodnow did 
not instigate the monarchial movement, as it appeared, 
but the memorandum was "seized upon as an excuse for 
22
rbid., 512, 515-516. 
2 3w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Jan. 7, 27, 1915, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
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launching the movement publicly. 112 4 
When Willoughby returned to Peking from a September 
vacation, the plans for the establishment of the monarchy 
were well under way. While his supporters feverishly 
made plans for his enthronement, Yuan Shih-k'ai modestly 
declared that he would not accept the throne, perhaps as 
25 
a ploy to sound out possible opposition to the move. 
By October, plans had been made to call a "citizen's 
26 
convention" to vote upon the change. Even Chinese who 
wanted progress and reform under a constitutional government 
supported the monarchy, possibly out of fear or perhaps 
out of hope that the establishment of the monarchy would 
satisfy Yuan's ambitions and permit concentration on 
27 
reform. 
Not all Chinese welcomed the proposed change. As 
various pro-monarchy and republican factions in Peking 
competed for his support, Willoughby found himself in an 
uncomfortable position. Some Chinese officials, including 
the secretary of state, asked him to use his influence as 
an advlser to persuade Yuan to give up plans for the 
2 4w. F. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, Jan. 4, 1916, 
ibid., Box 5, Folder 36. See also W. F. Willoughby to 
Westel, Sept. 8, 1915, ibid. 
25 New York Times, Aug. 25, 1915. 
26N ew York Times, Oct. 9, 1915. 
27 Reinsch, An American Diplomat, pp. 176-177. 
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monarchy. At the same time, the minister of agriculture 
reported to Yuan that Willoughby favored the change. 
Willoughby cared little about palace intrigue, but he 
feared the reestablishment of the empire. To his brother 
he confided, "absolutism . . is likely to be a feature 
28 
of a monarchy if it is restored." If the president asked 
for advice, Willoughby wrote, he did not intend to be used 
as Goodnow had been. He would try to persuade Yuan to 
move to the "right form" of government rather than "approve 
the change itself. 1129 
The memorandum Yuan soon requested on the change to 
monarchy was one of the shortest of Willoughby's papers. 
He deftly avoided placing his approval on the establishment 
of a monarchy and avoided altogether the vital question of 
whether monarchy was best for China. At this point, 
Willoughby argued, the form of government was not nearly 
as important as the need to establish a constitutional 
government. The commitment in 1912 to a republican form 
was not as significant as the decision to construct a 
government of law. This decision "constituted the really 
revolutionary feature of the change then effected." Law, 
28w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Sept. 18, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
29w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 4, 1915, ibid. In 
this letter Willoughby wrote that Roy Anderson, an American 
close to many Chinese officials, favored the monarchy and 
might have induced Goodnow to write the memorandum. 
\ 
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not the " a r b i tr a r y w i 11 of the so v e re i g n, 11 gave 1 e g i t i ma c y 
to China's government, and no discussion of the form of 
government should "obscure this fundamental fact. 1130 
Identifying constitutional government with progress, 
Willoughby warned against any appearance of absolutism. 
Because China was now committed to constitutional government, 
"great care should be taken that no backward step is made 
in this respect." To be sure, a monarchy could be a 
uonstitutional government, but constitutions were generally 
associated with republics. This association had occurred 
beuause monarchies were historically prone to absolutism. 
Consequently, Yuan's reestablishment of the monarchy would 
be understood both domestically and internationally as 
evidence of reaction, not progress, "a setback to 
constitutionalism, unless extreme precautions are taken 
to insure that this is in fact not the case." Yuan's 
decision to restore the monarchy, Willoughby concluded, 
would be judged by future generations on its ability to 
preserve China's commitment to modern constitutional 
31 government. 
At the same time that Willoughby expressed his 
commitment to a constitutional government, he recommended 
3°w. F'. Willoughby, "Some Observations on the Proposed 
Change of the Government of China from a Republic to that 
of a Monarchy," n.d., ibid., Box 5, Folder 42. 
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that a national assembly be included in the permanent 
constitution to serve as a consultative and advisory body 
Lo the "chief executive." Willoughby again emphasized 
Lhat the chief executive could not rely on autocratic 
power but needed to respond to public opinion and be 
held accountable for his actions. The national assembly 
wns the device by which the chief executive could be held 
accountable. He would present all proposed laws to the 
assembly for discussion, and the assembly in turn 
represented China's "public opinion." Moreover, the chief 
executive had to give to the assembly "a full account of 
the manner in which the great powers vested in him" were 
"excrcised. 1132 Thus, the national assembly had the power 
to assure that the actions of the chief executive conformed 
to the "desires of the people." As a further check, the 
publication and open discussion of the national budget 
required under Willoughby's plan insured that the chief 
executive was using his power wisely.33 
In his discussion of the budget, Willoughby explored 
again the problem of accountability. Government in China 
had to rest upon law, he argued. A chief executive could 
have "almost autocratic powers" as long as he exercised 
32 w. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Advisibility 
of Providing in the Permanent Constitution that the National 
Assembly be an Advisory and Consultative Body Only," n.d., 
ibid. 
33 rbid. 
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them "in accordance with the procedures laid down in the 
constitution." If matters of state were left solely to 
China's assembly, the result would be ''dissensions and 
di~;order," leading to serious internal trouble. However, 
Lhe discussion of a budget by the assembly provided a 
rational check over the chief executive's actions. His 
proposal was not perfect, Willoughby admitted, but it at 
le a ~~ t rep re s en t e d " an enormous s t e p . . away from a regime 
of pure autocracy" and laid a "basis for the progressive 
development of a government of public opinion as the 
political education of the people is achieved. 11 More 
significantly, Willoughby concluded that the adoption of 
his proposal would secure these benefits without jeopard-
i2ing China's basic need for a strong central government 
to maintain stability.34 
Since Yuan's plans to increase his personal power 
through the monarchy seemed clear by the fall of 1915, 
Willoughby's proposals to check the actions of the ''chief 
executive" through public opinion and the publication of 
a budget seem hopelessly naive. However, Willoughby was 
well aware of Yuan's ambitions and realized as well that 
the chance for constitutional, if not republican government, 
was fading in China. His memoranda represented an attempt 
to turn Yuan Shih-k'ai away from autocracy. If Yuan wanted 
34 Ibid. 
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support for the monarchy, he certainly received little 
f'rom WillouGhby. The constant reminders that power was 
derived from a constitution and that Yuan had to be 
accour1tuble to the people's representatives gave no stamp 
of approval to the exercise of imperial prerogatives. In 
r,ivinr, advice on the proposed change, Willoughby walked a 
narrow line. On the one hand, he did not want to give 
the impression of supporting the monarchy; on the other 
hand, outright opposition would have closed his access to 
Yuan altogether. 
Although there was some opposition to the monarchy in 
southern China, and although Japan and the Allies pressured 
Chinu to postpone the change to a monarchy, the movement 
for its establishment continued through the fall. The 
motives for the Allies' opposition were not entirely clear. 
In the case of the Europeans, they feared perhaps that the 
ld t d d th . . 35 change wou cause unres an en anger e1r concessions. 
Indeed, Japan's opposition to the monarchy might well have 
been designed to incite rebellion within China, thus 
providing an excuse for intervention to "restore order" 
and extend her influence. 36 Willoughby, fearing that the 
Allies had allowed Japan a free hand in Asia while the 
35 New York Times, Nov. 2, 1915. 
36Yim Kwan-ha, "Yuan Shih-k 'ai and the Japanese," 
Journal of Asian Studies, 24 (November, 1964), 64; Ch'en, 
Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 215-217. 
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European war raged, wondered in a letter to Westel about 
Japan's "real motives" in opposing the reestablishment of 
the empire. 37 However, Yuan and his supporters, discounting 
the advice of Japan and the European powers, planned well. 
When the national conference was called to vote on the 
proposed change, all 1,993 delegates, using the same forty-
five characters on their ballots, voted unanimously for 
the chance and designated Yuan Shih-k'ai as the new 
emperor. 38 
On December 11, 1915, the Council of State asked Yuan 
to accept the throne. After an initial modest refusal, 
Yuan accepted the offer, stating that he could not refuse 
the people's wishes. 39 Willoughby watched these moves 
with deep regret. Since he had submitted the memorandum 
on the proposed change, Yuan had not sent for him. In 
October he confessed to Westel, "I do not imagine that I 
will do much of importance for China during the remainder 
40 
of my stay." In December, soon after Yuan accepted 
the throne, he wrote: 
37 w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Nov. 5, and Dec. 17, 
1915, Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
38 ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 212. 
39 New York Times, Dec. 12, 1915, and Dec. 16, 1915. 
4°w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 20, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
I am inclined to think that Yuan will 
make it as absolute a gov't [sic] as he 
dares. I am by no means sanguine in 
respect to the ultimate result of the 
change.41 
Thereafter Willoughby turned his attention to making 
arrangements for his return to the United States. 
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Official American reaction to the monarchy was muted. 
Although President Wilson, American Minister Reinsch, and 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing were skeptical of the 
change, they still believed that Yuan Shih-k'ai was the 
ruler who could best maintain order in China. Moreover, 
like Willoughby, they perceived Japan's opposition to the 
monarchy as an attempt to weaken China's internal stability. 
Consequently, when asked by other powers to oppose the 
monarchy, the United States refused. Instead, the govern-
ment announced that the establishment of the monarchy was 
purely an internal matter and that China could choose her 
own government without foreign interference. China was 
not Mexico; and stability there was necessary to block 
Japanese encroachments on the Open Door. Since stability 
could possibly be achieved with the monarchy, Reinsch 
42 
and Lansing recommended recognition of the change. 
Outside diplomatic circles, American reaction was 
mixed. Willoughby wrote to Westel that the Carnegie 
41 w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Dec. 17, 1915, ibid. 
42 Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1969), pp. 149-153. 
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Endowment was displeased "with Goodnow's connection with 
the monarchist movement here. ,,43 Frederick Moore, a 
correspondent of the Associated Press and a friend of 
Willou~hby, assured the readers of World's Work that Yuan 
wa~3 not "personally ambitious" but had been "persuaded by 
the men around him" to take the throne.44 The Outlook 
ur~ued Lhat the form of government in China was not as 
important as its commitment to "social morality" and noted 
philosophically that "a republic in our radical sense of 
the word is hardly adapted to China's social system. 11 4 5 
An editorial in the Independent, however, called Yuan's 
reestablishment of the monarchy a "gigantic crime," "the 
crowning act of . . a long career of intrigue and 
treachery." Urging revolt against the regime, the 
Independent boldly summoned the United States 11 to the 
rescue of the Chinese people in their hour of distress. 11 4 6 
Some Chinese needed little urging from the Independent 
to begin a revolution. In late December, Yunnan province 
declared itself independent of Yuan's rule, and Kweichow 
43w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Dec. 17, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
44Frederick Moore, "Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Throne of 
China," World's Work, 31 (Feb. 1916), 373. 
45 11 China: 
1, 1915), 15. 
Republic or Monarchy," Outlook, 111 (Sept. 
4 611 A Betrayal of the Republic," Independent 53 (Dec. 
20, 1915 ), 457. 
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0oon followed. Some provincial leaders were genuinely 
Jisgusted by the restoration of the monarchy, but others 
merely hoped to increase their personal power. Whatever 
Lhe reasons for their revolt, Yuan had only limited 
success in crushing it, because support for his government 
had eroded in many areas of China. 47 Because of the revolts 
and the threat of Japanese intervention, Yuan postponed 
his coronation several times. 48 The December revolt had 
~reatly strengthened the hand of Japanese officials who 
wanted to use internal disorder as an excuse for extending 
Jupun'o influence in China. By March, the Japanese were 
fully committed to the support of the rebels and the 
destruction of Yuan Shih-k'ai's regime.4 9 
Although Willoughby believed at first that Yuan could 
control the rebellion, he grew more pessimistic as the 
monLhs passed. He wrote to Westel early in March, 1916, 
tlw. t there was "a possibility that the government will 
find itself unable to repress the rebellion." The personal 
loyalty of the Chinese officials once given to Yuan had 
weakened to the point that he was received as a "political 
appointment who has thought first of his own aggrandizement." 
Willoughby concluded: 
47 rmmanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 576-571. 
4 8 ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 227-228. 
49 Yim Kwan-ha, "Yuan Shih-k 'ai and the Japanese," 69-71. 
. my work here is practically finished. 
Practically no call has been made for my 
services since I refrained from coming out 
in favor of a monarchy.50 
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Soon after Kwangsi province declared itself independent 
on March, 15, 1916, Yuan Shih-k'ai's reign as emperor 
ended. The revolt's spread across China was certainly 
one cause of the monarchy's failure. Yuan had lost much 
of his personal control over the army while he served as 
president, and key military leaders had become opportunistic 
rather than loyal. As the army's loyalty shifted from 
Yuan to provincial military leaders, China's financial 
situation grew more unsteady, and Japanese pressure on 
China intensified. Yuan was forced to renounce the monarchy 
on March 22 and call for the establishment of a cabinet 
51 
system of government. 
This action, however, did not end the turmoil in China. 
Convinced that Yuan had to leave office, rebellious elements 
continued the war against him. In April, Willoughby mused 
that Yuan was "so discredited" that he simply could not 
unite China under any system of government. The monarchy 
might have been carried through, he believed, had Yuan not 
shown his weakness in acquiescing to Japan's demands for 
52 delay. 
50w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 1, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
51
ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 197-199; Yim Kwan-ha, 
"Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese," 71-73. 
52w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Apr. 2, 1916, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
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WillouGhby continued to worry over Japan's designs 
upon China's independence, but he greeted the news of the 
renunciation of the monarchy with some relief. "A real 
effort," he hoped, "will now be made to secure a permanent 
constitution and also to effect some administrative change. 1153 
Indeed, even as he prepared to leave China, he found hopeful 
signs that progress would continue, despite the still-
raging rebellion. He and Reinsch had formed a Chinese 
Political Science Association and were pleased with its 
initial success. Foreigners and Chinese participated in 
discussions and listened to lectures on current affairs 
at the association's meetings, and the association planned 
to publish a magazine. Both Reinsch and Willoughby hoped 
that the organization would provide both leaders and ideas 
for a progressive China. 5 4 
Moreover, even in his last days, Willoughby met with 
a political council, composed of various government 
officials and the advisers from Great Britain and Japan, 
to discuss China's political and administrative problems. 
Although he admitted that the group had been established 
primarily to secure foreign and domestic support for a 
faltering regime, Willoughby believed that the organization 
53w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 26, 1916, ibid. 
54william F. Willoughby, "The Chinese Political 
Science Association," Nation, 102 (Feb. 17, 1916), 193; 
Reinsch, An American Diplomat, pp. 153-154. 
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" i [; a p p a re n t 1 y earn e s t 1 y s e eking to do some th i n g . " As 
he f:inlshed his last letter from China, Willoughby hoped 
Lhut the abandonment of the monarchy meant "a reaffirmation 
of the desire of the people for a republic and a consti-
tuLion." There was, he believed, real hope that China 
55 
could progress if left free of Japanese control. 
Willoughby left China on April 19, 1916. His cautious 
optimism seemed unfounded. The government was barely 
functioning, and unrest in China did not cease for many 
years. He was succeeded in Peking, surprisingly, by his 
brother Westel, to whom he wrote a lengthy letter after his 
return from China. Willoughby predicted Yuan's departure 
us leader of China but added that the cabinet system Yuan 
hud proposed as a sop to the revolutionaries was "all 
wrong" and "will lead to years of acute political 
disturbances and unrest." Returning to a familiar idea, 
he reiterated his firm belief that only a strong executive 
with a national assembly could provide China with stable 
~overnment. China, he argued, had never settled the 
question of how much authority the central government should 
have, even though Yuan had in some instances dismantled the 
provincial governments through his system of military 
56 governors. 
55 w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Apr. 2, 1916, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
56w. F. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, Apr. 19, 
1916, ibid., Box 5, Folder 36. 
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Like Paul Reinsch, Willoughby believed that key 
reforms could be introduced to China on the provincial 
level. Writing to Westel, he urged that close attention 
be r,ivcn to reform of provincial and local governments, 
the Chinese tax system, the constabulary, and the adminis-
trHtive system. Yuan Shih-k'ai could no longer hope to 
mnintain a stable government for China, nor could the 
proposed cabinet system succeed where Yuan's personal 
r;overnment failed. Willoughby concluded, "I see no hope 
for China unless she is prepared to act in a radical way. 11 57 
To Simon North of the Carnegie Endowment, Willoughby 
wrote again of the threat Japan posed to United States' 
interests in China, and urged that the United States "spare 
no pains" to interpret events there. As for Chinese 
integrity and independence, the future offered little 
promise: 
. China will in all probabilities have 
to confront two alternatives: either she 
will enter upon a long period of political 
unrest, or she will have to suffer foreign 
intervention.58 
On Paul Reinsch's request, Willoughby set forth a 
proposal for direct foreign intervention in China to 
"establish a stable government based on modern principles. 11 59 
57w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Toronto, May 12, 1916, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35. 
58w. F. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, Apr. 19, 1916, 
ibid., Box 5, Folder 36. 
59w. F. Willoughby to Paul S. Reinsch, Toronto, May 
12, 1916, ~., Box 5, Folder 37. 
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Ile proposed the creation of a commission similar to that 
employed by the United States in the Philippines to give 
the Chinese experience and training in government. But 
fir0t, the participating nations would have to agree that 
they would control China only until such time that the 
Chinese could resume self-government. To be sure, the 
commission should set up some "representative" body to 
express Chinese opinion about the manner in which the 
covernment was run, but major organization would be left 
with foreign governments. Specifically, Willoughby 
recomrrended the establishment of a civil service system 
to train the Chinese for efficient administration, a code 
commission to revise all law, and a constabulary to enforce 
the law. In addition, foreign powers were to supervise 
60 
reform of the existing revenue and court systems. 
The United States had to take care that the major goal 
of the intervention was not obscured: the powers were to 
work only to educate the Chinese politically and put their 
eovernment on a sound basis. The process, Willoughby noted, 
was similar to placing China under a "receivership": 
. As in the case of all receiverships, 
it is the duty of the receiver to hasten 
in every way the date on which he can be 
discharged and the enterprise turned over 
to the stockholders.61 
60
rbid. 
61 Ibid. 
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That Willoughby would compare China's situation with 
a bankrupt firm was significant, for the comparison 
revealed much about his hopes for China and his conception 
or Lhe role of government in society. The corporation 
wns of ten used by Willoughby and other progressives 
iderttified with the efficiency and scientific management 
movements as a model for the reorganization of government. 
The corporation used efficient planning and administration 
to handle complex business functions. If well-managed, it 
provided an excellent example of what professionals and 
experts could accomplish. 
Tho letter to Reinsch marked the end of Willoughby's 
term as legal adviser. The time he spent in China was 
only eighteen months in a very full life. When he returned 
to the United States in the spring of 1916, he worked 
actively on preparedness, urging the adoption of efficient, 
scientific management techniques to win the war with the 
least possible cost in money and manpower. He also accepted 
the directorship of the Institute of Governmental Research, 
a part of the prestigious Brookings Institute, and worked 
with distinction for many years to promote sound government 
administration. While director of the Institute, he 
drafted and lobbied for a bill which created the Bureau of 
62 
the Budget. His distinguished public career extended 
62 For an interesting account of Willoughby's work at 
the Institute for Governmental Research, see Will P. 
Kennedy, "Silent Partner of Uncle Sam," Washington Star, 
Aug. 19, 1928, Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 1. ~~ 
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two decudes beyond his term as adviser to Yuan Shih-k'ai. 
Yuurt's term was drawing to a close when Willoughby left 
J\sia. Nearly stripped of power, Yuan died in June, 1916. 
AL hie~ death he did not leave a strong, stable China, but 
a country dominated by warlords. 
------~~~~~------------...................................................................... .. 
EPILOGUE 
When William F. Willoughby left Peking in the spring 
of 1916, China was no closer to the establishment of a 
stable government than when he arrived. Yuan Shih-k'ai 
was no longer capable of uniting the country, and the 
emergence of warlords exerted significant centrifugal 
force on Peking. The collapse of Yuan's monarchy left 
China in turmoil. Unfortunately, Willoughby's prediction 
of a long period of internal unrest was accurate. 
The United States had originally supported Yuan Shih-
k 'ai because he seemed capable of establishing a stable 
government in China, and a stable China was essential to 
the maintenance of the Open Door. If China could control 
internal unrest and resist Russian and Japanese encroach-
ments, American entrepreneurs could dispose of surplus 
manufactured goods and dominate the China market. Commercial 
penetration of China would enable the United States to 
preserve its own prosperity and expand its economic 
influence in Asia. 
The primary American interest in China, then, was 
commercial, but many citizens wished to expand American 
cultural and political influence as well. In the wake of 
the 1911 Revolution, missionaries, educators, journalists, 
and political scientists went to China to promote the growth 
102 
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of republican institutions and encourage her acceptance of 
we[; tern iclens. China's internal instability, financial 
wen kne~rn, and hesitancy in deciding upon a permanent 
eon~~ Li tut ion seemed to provide evidence of her need for 
adviec from an older republic. 
William Willoughby arrived in China with impressive 
experience in public administration. He had reorganized 
PuerLo Rico's tax structure and her municipalities, 
introduced the techniques of scientific management to the 
Ccnsuu Bureau, and served with distinction on the Taft 
Commission on Economy and Efficiency in Government. Like 
hi~~ predecessor Frank Goodnow and most Americans in China, 
he was convinced that China had to establish a stable 
government before she could adopt republican institutions. 
Instead of pressing first for constitutional reform, 
Willoughby proposed a progressive idea--the reorganization 
of China's administration. An efficient, well-trained 
civil service would curtail corruption and would protect 
the interests of all people. But more importantly, the 
expert--the tax collector, the constable, the accountant--
would literally provide the epoxy to hold China together. 
The administrator would serve as an efficient channel of 
communication between the people and the leadership. When 
this link was established, truly republican institutions 
could be unveiled, first at the local level, then at the 
provincial leve 1, and then at Peking. In short, Willoughby's 
proposed reforms reflected his identification with American 
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progressivism, and his goal--the establishment of a stable 
r,ovcrnment--was completely consistent with the policy of 
the Open Door. 
Willoughby faced a number of obstacles to the successful 
implementation of his proposals, and some of them he quickly 
He knew, for example, that Japan and Russia 
wished to extend their influence in China and that Japan 
would use China's domestic turmoil as an excuse for direct 
inLervention. He also realized that China could not 
successfully control disorder unless she defined precisely 
the power of the central government over her provinces. 
Both his proposals for administrative reform and his 
promotion of an American loan were designed to meet these 
eritical and interrelated problems. Unless Yuan Shih-k'ai 
eould control China's provinces and establish a workable 
arid financially solvent government, instability was likely 
to continue. Such instability precluded the establishment 
of republican institutions and offered Japan an opportunity 
to expand her influence in China. 
Yuan Shih-k'ai's ambition and his concept of govern-
ment posed yet another obstacle to reform. When Yuan 
promulgated the new presidential election law in December, 
1914, Willoughby knew that the prospects for successful 
development of republican government were growing dim. 
Both the new law and Yuan's request for information on 
Diaz of Mexico demonstrated that he was moving towards 
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increaE~ingly authoritarian rule, and during the rest of 
his term, Willoughby wrote his memoranda accordingly. In 
each or them, he tried to identify constitutional rule 
11nd administrative reform with Yuan's self-interest. 
Since Yuan was not predisposed towards republican govern-
mcnt, Willoughby hoped that appeals to political expediency 
might result in progress for China. 
Although Willoughby was aware of Yuan Shih-k'ai's 
ambition and distrust of republican government and recognized 
China's desperate need for a strong central government, he 
was probably not fully aware of the obstacles to reform 
posed by China's traditions. The Confucian bureaucracy 
respected the generalist, a scholar trained to follow and 
ir1culcate the teachings of the classics, and it prized 
gentleness, kindness, discretion, and wisdom in its officials. 
The specialist was merely an aide to the generalist, and 
his position possessed little prestige. 1 At the heart of 
a modern bureaucracy, however, was the expert, who was 
able to use his technical training to cope with the problems 
of an urban, industrial, and technologically advanced 
society. He was not supposed to exercise subjective 
judgment but was trained to act impersonally. 
Willoughby's bureaucrat was not charged with the 
1 c. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureau-
cratic Behavior," in Confucianism in Action, eds. David S. 
Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1959), p. 138. 
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maintenance of a hierarchial social structure but with 
the promotion of "social efficiency," a harmonization of 
the lnterests of various--and supposedly equal--social, 
political, and economic groups. His expertise and inde-
pendence enabled him to foil special interests in the 
interest of all the people. The Confucian scholar was 
also charged with the preservation of the harmony of society 
and the protection of the people, but in no sense did the 
Chinese peasant determine his best interests. Once the 
transition to republican government was complete, Willoughby's 
bureaucrat ultimately would have been accountable to the 
people, making decisions within the framework defined by 
their reprec.>entatives. 2 
The bureaucrat, then, was not the protector of an 
established social order and authoritarian government but 
the vanguard of participatory democracy. Although he 
admitted that the recruitment and training of his specialists 
would be very difficult and that adoption of his plans 
required "radical" change in China, there is no indication 
in either his letters or memoranda that Willoughby fully 
appreciated the drastic departure from tradition that 
implementation of his proposals required. In fairness to 
Willoughby, however, it should be noted that many Chinese 
were convinced that the Confucian bureaucracy could not 
2samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 101-103, 107. 
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cope with the demands of modernization and that China would 
have to adopt at least some features of a western civil 
service system. 3 
Willoughby's comparisons with Puerto Rico also suggest 
that he had only a superficial knowledge of China's 
traditions and culture. Although his participation in 
the reorganization of that island's government provided 
valuable experience, he was too quick to draw parallels 
between his successes there and the needs of China. 
Obviously, the size of the two countries, their cultures, 
and their populations differed significantly. The vastness 
of China alone made central control of her hinterland 
difficult. Moreover, Puerto Rico did not initiate reform, 
nor did she develop her own government institutions; the 
United States had imposed a government upon her. The 
success of that imposition is in question today. Eventually, 
of course, Willoughby despaired of the prospects for 
reform in China and concluded that foreign powers would 
have to reorganize her administration as the United States 
had done in Puerto Rico. 
Even if Yuan Shih-k'ai had been receptive to 
Willoughby's proposals, it is doubtful that China's 
JWilliam F. Willoughby to Westel, May 12, 1916, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35, Earl Gregg Swem 
Library, College of William and Mary; William T. DeBary, 
"Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism," in Confucianism 
in Action, eds. Nivison and Wright, p. 48. 
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leudership could have put them into effect. The military 
Governors in the provinces had no intention of turning 
over their power--and their sources of revenue--to 
Willoughby's bureaucrats. Moreover, the prospects for 
eventual republican government were not strong. The 
support for a republic in China came from a relatively 
small number of Chinese intellectuals, and the citizenry 
was apathetic, neither willing nor able to participate in 
public affairs. With Yuan's support, republicanism might 
have won more advocates; but without support of the people, 
a republic could not have been successfully established 
China. 4 in 
When he became frustrated by Yuan Shih-k'ai's auto-
cratic rule, the incredible scope of China's problems, 
and his own ineffectiveness as an adviser, Willoughby 
turned to consideration of a "receivership." But this 
proposal, too, was unrealistic. Neither the United States 
nor the European powers had enough military power in the 
Far East to occupy and reorganize China. Even if other 
nations had agreed to help, as Willoughby proposed, 
reconciliation of the receivers' interests would have been 
impossible. Japan, for example, simply did not share the 
United States' desire for a strong, independent China. 
Lastly, nationalism was a potent force in China, and many 
4Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 2nd. ed. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 211. 
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Chinese resented European control of her salt and customs 
5 
revenue. It is doubtful, then, that the Chinese would 
have peacefully accepted western control of her entire 
administrative system. 
In Willoughby's desire for stability and progress 
for China, even at the cost of receivership, lay still 
another inherent problem. Although he thought of himself 
as an impartial expert, he was not. In his mind, the 
interests of China and the United States were identical, 
and he advised the Chinese accordingly. When Willoughby 
perceived that Japan's Twenty-One Demands presented a 
threat to both Chinese and American interests, he urged 
Yuan to establish close diplomatic and financial ties 
with the United States to thwart her ambitions. To be 
sure, Japan's desire to extend commercial and political 
influence in Manchuria, Shantung, and Mongolia were a 
threat to China's sovereignty, but Willoughby's recom-
mendations would have expanded the American presence in 
China. Japan represented the "yellow peril," but American 
expansion promised only a positive influence on China's 
development. 
Because Willoughby's goals for China were consistent 
with the goals of American foreign policy, one might reason-
ably conclude that Willoughby acted in accordance with 
5 John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 3rd. 
ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 190. 
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instructions from the United States government. Certainly 
he urged Yuan Shih-k'ai to develop close relationships 
with both the American government and financial community. 
Only the United States, he wrote, had "a keen interest 
and sympathy" towards the establishment of a stable govern-
ment, and he added that the United States was "a great 
political asset to China in the difficulties, internal 
and external, 6 that confront her." When he explored the 
possibilities of a loan, he fully intended to use it not 
only as incentive for reform but as a means of extending 
American influence in China. Nevertheless, there is no 
evidence that Willoughby acted as an agent of the United 
States in any formal sense. The coincidence of goals 
stemmed from Willoughby's belief that stability and the 
acceptance of American ideas promised progress for China. 
The Willoughby Papers and State Department documents 
also give no indication that Willoughby either directly 
or indirectly influenced American policy in China. His 
proposal for a loan perhaps promised an impact on policy, 
but the loan never materialized. The United States never 
intervened either unilaterally or multilaterally to effect 
Willoughby's receivership, and the article on the Twenty-
one Demands came to Goodnow too late to be of use in 
winning American support for China. Since Willoughby and 
6w. F. Willoughby, "The War, Its Causes, and More 
Important Consequences Likely to Result From It, 11 Nov. 
1914, Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 42. 
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Paul Reinsch were close friends, it is possible that he 
might have affected Reinsch's decisions. The two men met 
often for bridge and frequently travelled together. They 
both played a major role in the establishment of the Chinese 
Political Science Association, and both hoped that China 
could eventually adopt a republican government. If 
Willoughby's ideas influenced Reinsch or the American 
State Department, however, their impact remains hidden. 
Willoughby's precise relationship with Dr. Frank J. 
Goodnow and the Carnegie Endowment also remains obscure. 
The Carnegie Endowment, of course, suggested his appoint-
ment to the Chinese, but the exact circumstances surrounding 
the appointment are still unknown. His relationship with 
Goodnow is even more puzzling. Although he was nominally 
Goodnow's deputy, Willoughby apparently worked independently 
of him, wrote to him only sporadically, and communicated 
directly with the Carnegie Endowment. The Willoughby 
Papers, however, do provide some new information on the 
mystery surrounding the Goodnow memorandum of August, 1915. 
Unfortunately, Willoughby wrote no letters to his brother 
westel that summer because his brother was with him in 
China. Consequently, this valuable source on Peking 
affairs is not available. But the letters to Simon North 
and to Westel after his departure from Peking indicate that 
Goodnow was not a naive adviser. Although there is still 
no conclusive evidence of Goodnow's exact intentions, 
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one can reasonably agree with historian Noel Pugach that 
Goodnow valued stability in China above the existence of 
a nominal republic. 
When Goodnow feared instability in China and faced 
frustration there, he gambled first on a strong presidency 
and then on a monarchy to achieve substantial reform and 
stable government. Willoughby instead chose a solution 
consistent with his background as a public administrator 
and a progressive, the adoption of administrative reform. 
In light of the available evidence, however, one can 
conclude that his efforts to influence China failed. He 
could neither persuade Yuan Shih-k'ai to effect major 
reform nor convince him of the value of republican govern-
ment. It is possible that Willoughby's ideas encouraged 
the Chinese who were already interested in the establish-
ment of a republican government or the application of the 
techniques of scientific management to government adminis-
tration. But there is no evidence that the Chinese ever 
implemented his proposals. The obstacles to the adoption 
of western government and philosophy were too difficult 
to overcome. 
What lessons, then, did Americans learn from Willoughby's 
experience? Like many Americans, he was convinced of the 
superiority of western ideas and institutions, and he 
believed China's progress depended upon her adoption of a 
western model for her development. That China would find 
her own solution to her problems probably never occurred 
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to him. His own failure to achieve significant reform 
indicated that the power of the United States to influence 
the development of China was limited. Good intentions 
notwi Uwtanding, Americans must respect the right of 
other nations to develop their own institutions in 
accordance with their own history and culture, free from 
any form of ideological imperialism. 
American attempts to bring western civilization to 
China continued long after Willoughby's departure, and 
thoLle who followed him met with as little success. Barbara 
Tuchman, in Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 
drew a conclusion about American efforts to influence 
China's development in the 1940's which was as applicable 
to Willoughby and the Progressives as it was to the Americans 
a generation beyond them: "In the end, China went its own 
way as if the Americans had never come." 
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